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ABSTRACT 
  
Any consideration of the aural reception of Christian faith must take the ecclesial practice 
of music and its relation to the divine logos into account. Specifically, the logos provides 
normativity for such music, as the latter endeavours to proclaim that divine Word. 
Contemporary theological reflections on music are made difficult by the modern 
development of the concept of taste, which has culminated in a radicalized subjectivity 
that eschews normative criteria. A reclamation of the normative role of the logos is thus 
required in the dogmatic theology of music. 
Karl Barth’s theology is examined in order to establish the critical relation 
between proclamation and dogmatics. Barth’s praise of Mozart is reviewed to 
demonstrate how his detachment from a broader historical tradition confines him to a 
strictly formalist aesthetic that is unable to hear musical meaning. Further examination of 
his early writings reveal how his critical revelatory dialectic, vis-à-vis his reading of the 
Auftrag, prohibits a proclamatory role for the ecclesial practice of music. 
Pope Benedict XVI’s theology provides a fitting alternative, as his dogmatic 
reflections assume a necessarily kerygmatic role for music that Barth denies. In this 
Benedict is more in tune with the ancient Church Fathers. His dogmatic reflections on the 
“musified” logos are in dialectical tension with modern philosophies of music, as he 
espouses a Christian rationality over against modern secular/subjective reason. This 
dialectic is augmented with a comparison of Augustine and Kant on the practice of 
counting. Finally, contrary to some readings, the normativity of Benedict’s musical logos 
is not an oppressive force, hampering the freedom of musical performance. 
A “descriptive” method of dogmatic reflection is finally recommended, in which 
the theology of music approximates a kind of journalistic “music criticism,” albeit one 
that listens for the Word of Christ, the hearing of which brings faith (Romans 10:17). 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Faith comes from listening to God’s word. 
But wherever God’s word is translated into 
human words there remains a surplus of the 
unspoken and unspeakable which calls us 
into silence—into a silence that in the end 
lets the unspeakable become song and also 
calls on the voices of the cosmos for help so 
that the unspoken may become audible.”1 
 
SPEECH AND SONG IN JEAN-LUC GODARD’S ONE PLUS ONE 
In One Plus One, promoted by its producers as Sympathy for the Devil, film director Jean-
Luc Godard presents an inquiry into the sources and methods of communicating meaning 
through sound.2 From the outset, the visual imagery of the film is secondary in 
importance to its sound, serving to contextualize the more prominent reverberations of 
speech and music.  
Multiple vignettes disclose an assortment of social commentary.3 Militant 
revolutionaries, seeking freedom for themselves, proclaim an ideology that ends in 
violence toward others. A metaphorical interview with Democracy reveals that she 
neither knows nor cares what she truly believes. A pornographic bookstore reverberates 
with a reading of Mein Kampf, while its customers abuse two Jewish prisoners. In each of 
these scenes (and others), speech and text is presented as suspect, as if they are means 
toward hampering the peace and prosperity of a free and creative society.4  
                                                 
1
 Joseph Ratzinger, “‘In the Presence of the Angels I Will Sing Your Praise’: The Regensburg Tradition and 
the Reform of the Liturgy,” A New Song for the Lord: Faith in Christ and Liturgy Today (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1996), 175. 
2
 Jean-Luc Godard, dir., One Plus One, aka Sympathy for the Devil (London: Cupid Productions, 1968). 
3
 While describing One plus one as his “last bourgeois film,” Godard confesses his arrogance in taking 
images “thinking I knew what they meant.” See Kent E. Carroll, “Film and Revolution: Interview with the 
Dziga-Vertov Group,” in Focus on Godard, edited by Royal S. Brown, Film Focus (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1972), 62. 
4
 For a detailed account of the sources utilized in One plus one, see Julia Lesage, Jean-Luc Godard: a guide 
to references and resources, A Reference Publication in Film (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1979), 96-99. 
2 
Such a subtext is made particularly evident by an auditory contrast that is 
presented throughout the film. Interspersed with the vignettes described above are scenes 
of the Rolling Stones in London’s Olympic Studios, recording their hit song, “Sympathy 
for the Devil.”5 In stark contrast to the dictatorial manner of speech and text elsewhere in 
the film, music is portrayed as a more organic process, in which each performer has a 
unique contribution to make, in a free and honest “conversation” of sorts with the others 
in the room. When a background vocal track is finally added, a makeshift choir assembles 
around a microphone to join in song. The lyrical words are fixed, but—unlike the fixed 
texts of the more violent or repressive ideologies—the words as sung take on life as they 
find articulation in lively harmony. A diametric opposition between speech and music is 
presented to the audience, as the creative process of singing and playing in community is 
juxtaposed with violence and repetition without change. Regardless of his artistic intent, 
Jean-Luc Godard in effect raises the question what difference there is between singing 
and speaking. Such is the underlying issue of this dissertation.  
The difference between speech and song forms a particularly vexing problem for 
Christian theology. If, as Romans 10:17 indeed proclaims, faith comes from hearing 
(fides ex auditu), and that what is heard comes through the word of Christ, the question of 
how such hearing occurs is begged. Will faith arrive while hearing the biblical text read 
aloud? By a dynamic preacher, trenchantly relating scripture with contemporary events? 
Or perhaps by the sound of choirs singing, lutes playing, or cymbals being struck? 
Godard’s question, then, becomes a theological one—what difference is there between 
speaking the Word, and singing the Word? 
Phenomenologically speaking, there clearly is a difference between speech and 
music. But Godard’s curious juxtaposition demands an evaluative examination that is 
                                                 
5
 Rolling Stones, “Sympathy for the Devil,” Beggars Banquet, Decca SKL4955. 
3 
both moral and aesthetic in character. Is pure text—without the “play” of tonality, rhythm 
and timbre in music—an inherently violent force? How does the imposition of textual 
elements upon musical performance affect the moral and aesthetic character of such 
music? In theological terms, what role does the divine logos play in regards to music, 
particularly the ecclesial practice of music? 
While a variety of aural practices are performed within the church, perhaps none 
is as familiar as the sound of music. Whether in the style of Byzantine or Gregorian chant, 
Victorian hymn, Southern gospel or contemporary “praise and worship,” the 
overwhelming majority of Christian churches include music as a prominent practice.6 
Any consideration of the aural reception of Christian faith, therefore, must take the 
musical practice of the church and its relation to the divine logos into account. 
The primary contention of this dissertation is that the logos provides normativity 
for the ecclesial practice of music. Such normativity is not an oppressive force, 
hampering the freedom of musical performance, although such an argument has been 
made.7 Rather, the divine Word sings and sounds the way music should sing and sound. It 
is an aesthetic norm; it is a moral norm.  
 
THE QUEST FOR AESTHETIC AND MORAL NORMATIVITY 
Up to the eighteenth century, there was no need to establish aesthetic and moral norms; 
they had been established with the Platonic triad of truth, beauty and goodness. As the 
aesthetic category of “taste” emerged in philosophical discourse, however, a subjective-
objective disjunction began to break down these universal norms. Originally taste 
assumed a normative role in aesthetics and ethics; however it gradually developed to 
                                                 
6
 Although several Christian traditions severely restrict the manner of their musical practice, an instance of 
a church completely lacking in musical practice is difficult to identify. In any event, the wholesale lack of 
music would simply present another type of musical practice, one which values the absence of tonality or 
rhythm in its “music.”  
7
 Most notably in Heidi Epstein’s published doctoral dissertation, Melting the Venusberg: a feminist 
theology of music (New York: Continuum, 2004), which will be analysed and critiqued below. 
4 
emphasize a radical subjectivity—one that now eschews the imposition of aesthetic 
standards.  
The “gustatory metaphor” of taste emerged as the “central theoretical debate of 
early modern aesthetics.”8 In the late seventeenth century, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third 
Earl of Shaftesbury, countered the Hobbesian notion that human actions are instrinsically 
selfish. Acknowledging Hobbes’ observation that humans may indeed receive pleasure in 
performing an action, Shaftesbury refuted the claim that such pleasure is the primary 
motive for the act. Thus arose a "disinterested aesthetic contemplation" in contrast to a 
"practical interest."9 Subjective pleasures and desires were subsequently depicted as less 
than true, as an objective disinterest began to bear the responsibility of a moral compass. 
Thus it was only by divesting oneself of personal involvement that one could identify the 
true, the good and the beautiful.10 Taste, like harmony, was both an aesthetic and a moral 
category; the person with good taste was, for Shaftesbury, also one with moral sense. 
Peter Kivy has argued that for this reason, much in modern aesthetic theory would be 
benefited by reclaiming Shaftesbury’s notion of “moral sense.”11 Shaftesbury answered 
the question of standards of taste by recourse to reason and natural law: “For HARMONY 
is Harmony by Nature, let men judge even so ridiculously of Musick. So is Symmetry and 
Proportion founded still in Nature, let Mens Fancy prove ever so Gothick in their 
Architecture, Sculpture, or whatever other designing Art.”12  
                                                 
8
 Carolyn Korsmeyer, “Taste,” in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, edited by Berys Gaut and 
Dominic McIver Lopes, Routledge Companions to Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2001), 196. 
9
 Jerome Stolnitz, “On the Origins of ‘Aesthetic Disinterest’,” JAAC 20 (1961): 131-143. 
10
 Shaftesbury’s debt to the Cambridge Platonists is plainly evident. See Stolnitz, “On the Significance of 
Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic Theory, The Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1961): 97-113 and Dabney 
Townsend, “Shaftesbury’s Aesthetic Theory,” JAAC 41 (1982): 205-213. 
11
 Peter Kivy, The Seventh Sense: Francis Hutcheson & Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), 20. 
12
 Qtd. in ibid., 22. 
5 
After Shaftesbury, taste became increasingly important in the emerging field of 
aesthetics.13 The empiricists of the eighteenth century (Hutcheson, Addison, Burke et al) 
established various approaches to the matter of standards of taste, but it was David Hume 
who guided it toward the radically subjective understanding that is widespread today.14 In 
this essay, Hume understands taste as both preference for particular things and the ability 
to discriminate. Hume seeks a standard of taste, however, conceding that the “great 
variety of Taste” is “too obvious not to have fallen under every one’s observation.”15 Yet 
Hume is not the aesthetic relativist. It is by “a species of common sense” that there must 
be some standard; to claim the opposite would be the equivalent of judging “a mole-hill 
to be as high as TENERIFFE.”16 Through practice and education, a certain “delicacy of 
imagination” (i.e. the ability to distinguish objective aesthetic qualities, such as the hint of 
metal or leather in wine) may be developed.17 Hume preserves the “aesthetic attitude” of 
disinterest, by challenging the critic to “preserve his mind free from all prejudice, and 
allow nothing to enter into his consideration, but the very object which is submitted to his 
examination.”18 Hume is ambiguous about what exactly the standard of taste is: whether 
it consists in the judgment of experts or certain rules.19 Despite the lack of definitive 
standards in Hume’s thought, however, this essay both establishes an assumption of the 
                                                 
13
 As Kivy and others have noted, it was the rise of the English middle class that demanded aesthetic 
theory—as multitudes of consumers wished to understand the art to which they were now gaining access. 
Kivy, 10-11; see also John Brewer, The Pleasures of the Imagination (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997), 3-55. 
14
 This cursory review of taste in philosophical perspective cannot attend to the numerous theories of taste 
that emerged in the eighteenth century, but can only sketch the direction of thought on taste toward its 
current notion of radical subjectivity.  
15
 Hume, “On the Standard of Taste,” Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, volume 1, edited by T.H. 
Green and T.H. Grose, London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1907, 266. 
16
 Ibid., 269. 
17
 Ibid., 272, 280. 
18
 Ibid., 276. 
19
 See Jeffrey Wieand, “Hume’s Two Standards of Taste,” PQ 34 (1984): 129-142 and James Shelley, 
“Hume’s Double Standard of Taste,” JAAC 52 (1994): 437-445. 
6 
variety of tastes in society, and turns further toward the subject’s own ability to discern 
aesthetic values.20  
Following Hume’s examination of subjective taste, is Kant’s third critique, the 
Critique of Judgment. No longer puzzled with identifying the “synthetic a priori,” Kant 
now wishes to establish the “intersubjective validity of taste.” It is in this work that Kant 
proceeds to demonstrate how aesthetic judgments (e.g., beauty and, to a different extent, 
the sublime) may be both subjective and universal. The objective element has been 
eliminated; there is no need for Kant to find aesthetic qualities in objects themselves. 
Kant does this by asserting that judgments regarding the beautiful are judgments in which 
the subject’s imagination harmonizes with the concepts of the understanding. “Es wird 
also eine Gesetzmäßigkeit ohne Gesetz, und eine subjektive Übereinstimmung der 
Einbildungskraft zum Verstande, ohne eine objektive,…mit der Eigentümlichkeit eines 
Geschmacksurteils allein zusammen bestehen können.”21 Such a judgment is, for Kant, 
universal in that all subjects have similar categories of understanding and reason. 
Similarly, judgments of the sublime are those in which the subjective imagination defers 
to the subject’s own reason.22 In either case, taste—as the faculty of aesthetic judgment—
is an entirely subjective affair. Universal though the judgments of taste may be, Kant's 
codification of the aesthetic into the subjective sphere empties the object of any sort of 
meaning or value. 
While Kant indeed intended to establish a kind of universal standard or norm in 
the third critique, the contours of his argument did not survive into general discourse. 
What did result, however, was a radical turn into subjectivity. As Hans-Georg Gadamer 
                                                 
20
 There has been much debate concerning a “causal theory” of taste in Hume, in which objective aesthetic 
qualities cause a certain sentiment to arise in the subject. Given Hume’s infamous argument against 
causation, however, such an assessment is difficult to maintain. See Roger Shiner, “The Causal Theory of 
Taste,” JAAC 54 (1996): 237-249. 
21
 KU, 325. 
22
 Kant’s Analytic of the Sublime and its peculiar account of reason will be examined in chapter four.  
7 
has observed, “we generally fail to recognize the ideal normative element in the concept 
of taste and are still affected by the relativistic-skeptical argument about differences of 
taste.”23 Furthermore, just as Gadamer observes that Kant’s moral philosophy "purified 
ethics from all aesthetics and feeling,” Kant’s aesthetics comes perilously close to losing 
its moral elements.24 Kant “restricted the idea of taste to an area in which, as a special 
principle of judgment, it could claim independent validity—and, by so doing, limited the 
concept of knowledge to the theoretical and practical use of reason.”25 Hence through 
Kant’s construction of intersubjective taste, this “gustatory metaphor” lost its relation to 
knowledge or the “moral sense,” leading aesthetics toward a radically subjective 
enterprise. 
Gadamer continues his critique of post-Kantian aesthetics in the larger context of 
the humanities in general. As knowledge was limited to metaphysics and ethics, and 
forced out of the reach of aesthetics, “the methodological uniqueness of the human 
sciences lost its legitimacy” as it became “impossible to acknowledge the truth claims of 
traditionary materials….”26 Kant cannot allow the artwork to possess truth in the manner 
of conceptual knowledge (pure and practical reason), leaving the assessment and criticism 
of art to be guided by “the superiority of genius [over] any aesthetics based on rules.”27 
In a postmodern context of such radical subjectivity arises the unremarkable (but 
extraordinarily composed) thesis of Pierre Bourdieu in his examination of the role of 
preference (i.e. subjective “taste”) in making aesthetic distinctions.28 For Bourdieu the 
various competing “discourses of justification” are ultimately rooted in social class and 
                                                 
23
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed., translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1999), 40. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid., 41. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 See Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, translated by Richard Nice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984). 
8 
aspiration. Thus a person’s preference of Mozart over Metallica is due not to any intrinsic 
aspects of Mozart or Metallica’s music, but rather the social class or aspirations of the 
individual. A world of art has diffused into distinct art-worlds, where the value of 
artworks arises from within the various groups that patronize particular types of art.29 
While the subjectivity of taste may no longer reside with the autonomous Kantian 
individual, it remains the determinant factor of aesthetic judgment in the form of disparate 
social groups. Aesthetics have left the public arena to be judged collectively, as part of a 
group habitus, where a non-objective taste reigns supreme in a new form of collective 
subjectivism. 
 
TASTE, NORMATIVITY, AND THE ECCLESIAL PRACTICE OF MUSIC 
The modern presumption of taste as a determinative category in aesthetic judgment has 
largely informed what is often (and unfortunately) called the “worship wars.”30 In the 
wake of the liturgical reforms of the Second Vatican Council, Protestant and Catholic 
communities alike have been racked with heated discussions regarding stylistic factors in 
the ecclesial practice of music. Far too often, such discussions of the church's music 
reduce considerations of any and all aesthetic norms to a preferential notion of the 
principle of taste, i.e. whatever style of music the community prefers to hear, that is the 
music they shall have. Such taste, informed as it is by social location and/or social 
aspirations, and whether exercised in the aesthetic or the moral sphere, ultimately serves a 
more divisive than unifying role in communities of faith. As Quentin Faulkner has 
observed, differences of taste in the worshipping community “are largely irreconcilable 
                                                 
29
 Cf. Howard S. Becker’s pluralist adaptation of Danto’s notion of the “artworld” in Art Worlds (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1982), 131-164. Danto’s singular version is presented in Arthur Danto, 
“The Artworld,” The Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964): 571-584. 
30
 See Thomas G. Long, Beyond the Worship Wars: building vital and faithful worship (Washington, DC: 
Alban Institute, 2001); Ronald P. Byars, The Future of Protestant Worship: beyond the worship wars 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002); Marva J. Dawn, How Shall We Worship?: biblical 
guidelines for the worship wars (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2003). 
9 
and…have made a point of contention out of what ought to be one of the major signs and 
causes of Christian peace and unity.”31 Faulkner correctly indicates the problem, yet 
offers no solution. 
One solution regarding taste has been proposed by Frank Burch Brown in Good 
Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste.32 Although he is one of the few to address the 
notion of taste in the context of the ecclesial practice of music,33 he attempts to reframe 
the debate over worship wars while retaining the category of taste. Arguing against the 
capriciousness of subjective taste, Brown calls for an inclusive, ecumenically Christian 
taste that invites everyone to the table.34  
This at first appears as a valid argument, but critical analysis of another 
contemporary scholar of the ecclesial practice of music reveals the pitfalls of Brown’s 
solution. Gordon Graham has characterized the debate in terms of specific values.35 In the 
place of “traditional” and “contemporary” musical tastes, he has described those who 
pursue musical excellence for the glory of God on the one hand, and those who value 
greater inclusion on the other. One includes music as a kind of moral good, in which the 
perfection, or sanctification, of performability is the goal. The other sees music as a 
practice in which the church may come together in a communal performance—not unlike 
Brown’s espousal of inclusivity. Yet the fact that such values are perceived to be in 
conflict demonstrates that the capriciousness of taste has simply shifted to the moral, 
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rather than the aesthetic, sphere.36  To be sure, the values outlined in Graham’s study are 
laudable. An ecumenically-informed ecclesiology must value inclusivity, and any 
conception of soteriology that attends to the continual process of sanctification will surely 
honor the working towards aesthetic perfection.37 Yet something is obviously amiss when 
these two values are held in opposition. Either path—perfection or inclusivity—
demonstrates that taste cannot adequately determine the values (aesthetic or moral) of 
worship.  
The resulting ecclesiology refers less to an ecclesia, a gathering or assembly 
according to the Spirit of Christ, than it refers to an economic enterprise—a record label 
or concert venue, perhaps—that serves the desires of its customers. Such an ecclesiology 
is clearly against the church’s self-understanding as shaped by scripture and tradition. In 
large measure this project is an attempt to bring music back within a properly 
ecclesiological framework, as its place within the church’s definitive mission and witness 
is described. The gustatory approach to the church’s music must be superseded; a 
normative external standard is required. 
If taste is excluded as a normative principle for guiding the music of the church, 
then it remains to be shown what can and should perform this guiding task. By framing 
the contemporary “worship wars” in terms of (early) modern aesthetics, the more ancient 
concerns regarding music have been neglected. Only by retrieving the ancient, and 
critiquing the philosophical foundations of the modern, may the present discussion move 
forward. What is needed, however, is not just another anthropocentric principle—like 
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taste but somehow different—some single absolute principle that exercises its tyranny 
over the many. This would just present the same problem that is presented when taste is 
elevated to a principial level. We must turn from the radically subjective, gustatory 
approach to aesthetics and instead (re)learn to approach it via the normativity of the 
divine logos. 
What is needed is a kind of theological science, a Theologiewissenschaft, that 
takes the ecclesial practice of music as its object of critical study, while preserving the 
normativity of the divine logos. To be sure, there are centers of “practical theology” of 
music all over the world—the Institute of Sacred Music at Yale University and the 
Pontifical Institute of Sacred Music in Rome being perhaps the most notable examples. 
But these are exceptions to the rule. Church music is often a field of its own, with little 
integration into the other theological sciences. Church music directors are generally 
valued more for the practical results of their labors than their theology, and academic 
theologians are not (usually!) known for their knowledge of music.38 The designation of 
“practical theology” is often viewed in the academy as more “practical” than 
“theological,” preparing students to practice, but without the necessary critical 
theological reflection upon such practice. 
 
THE KERYGMATIC ROLE OF THE ECCLESIAL PRACTICE OF MUSIC 
There are signs in theological circles that this situation is changing. A number of studies 
of church music and theologies of music have come out in recent years, taking different 
approaches but all looking toward a future of increased scholarship in the area. Many of 
these projects have opted for a historical look at music and the church, but a few 
exceptions have attempted a full constructive theology of music. 
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One such approach could be termed the natural-theological approach, taken by 
Albert L. Blackwell in The Sacred in Music.39 Blackwell describes how music, in 
sacramental fashion, imparts a sense of the transcendent God. In music we encounter 
“mystery,” and that for him constitutes the presence of the sacred. Such an approach, 
constructing a picture of God from the material of natural phenomena, is highly 
questionable after Barth’s historical Nein! in response to Emil Brunner’s natural theology. 
Blackwell is cognizant of the Barthian perspective, and defends himself by castigating 
Barth for silencing such theological work, claiming that Barth’s  
tendency to divorce God the creator from the created world is a cause of 
alienation for many in our day who marvel at the cosmos, revere its 
mystical origin and sacred integrity, and might do so within established 
religious traditions if only those traditions would give them greater 
opportunity. This alienation engendered by radical theism is as 
unnecessary as it is unfortunate….”40 
 
Blackwell boldly asserts that if natural theology was not considered anathema to Christian 
orthodoxy, more people would become Christians. This accommodation of theology to 
apologetics is regrettable, for Blackwell’s project is one of the few theological studies of 
music to delve so deeply into matters of music theory and composition.41  
Patrick Sherry provides a succinct and critical account of natural theology, 
agreeing that it “answers certain basic urges in human beings, and…its arguments are 
closely related to some religious doctrines, so that it has a perennial appeal.”42 However, 
he adds, such attractiveness “is not necessarily the foundation of theistic belief.”43 Barth 
provides an even stronger nail for the natural-theological coffin, one which insists that the 
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possibility for knowledge of God resides not in humanity or nature, but in God. 
Upholding the sovereignty of God (and the corresponding epistemic depravity of 
humanity) as his primary principle, Barth views the possibility of knowledge of God as 
relying ultimately and completely on God’s power to reveal. Without revelation of God, 
there would be no human knowledge of God.  
Barth’s critique must stand, therefore, for if music—as an element of the natural 
world—is included within the rubric of that which is fallen from grace, how can it 
possibly yield theological insights that are not themselves also disconnected from God’s 
truth?44 Thus in constructing a theology of music, we cannot take Blackwell’s natural-
theological route. Our feeble minds and bodies may certainly marvel that the hills are 
“alive with the sound of music.” Music is indeed a source of wonderment. But that is not 
to say that such wonderment imparts knowledge of God. It simply demonstrates how 
easily impressed we depraved humans can be; knowledge of God is an entirely different 
affair.45  
An alternative approach could be termed the doxological approach, taken by 
Jeremy Begbie in Theology, Music and Time.46 This approach does not succumb to 
Barth’s criticisms of natural theology, as it refuses to describe the divine in terms of the 
fallen created order. Begbie affirms that an “epistemic alienation” from God nullifies any 
kind of natural theology and, furthermore, denies that his project takes such an approach.  
…it would be inappropriate to characterize this study as an attempt at 
natural theology, since there has been a desire to avoid presupposing 
theological criteria more ultimate than the reconciling self-disclosure of 
God in and through the incarnate Son, testified in Scripture, recognized 
and affirmed through the transforming presence and activity of the Spirit.47 
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Begbie argues that since music is a “set of practices” that exist concretely (and not 
abstractly), it is fully embedded within the fallen order of things. What music can do for 
theology, he argues, is a matter of (re)presentation. Music can “highlight” and 
“instantiate” one aspect of the created order, namely, temporality. In doing so, “music to 
some degree discloses that temporality.”48 Begbie comes close to saying that music is 
revelatory of the natural world, acting as a kind of epistemological medium. Thus music 
does not tell us so much about God, as it does God’s creation.49 
 As for music’s relation to God, Begbie takes an approach quite similar to Barth, in 
that he defines music as “the sound of the created order praising God, in its contingency, 
finitude and non-divinity.”50 Among the more unique contributions of Begbie’s 
perspective is that he refuses to treat the so-called “Pythagorean comma” as a theological 
problem: “But why…should the Pythagorean comma be regarded as a disorder? The 
problem here seems to be an over-keenness to give divine sanction to a particular type of 
mathematical order.”51 Such attention to how music discloses God’s creation and, 
thereby, praises God’s handiwork is part of his larger project, that of theology through the 
arts, rather than theology of the arts.52  
The approach of the present dissertation, however, presents a different approach to 
music. Although not opposed to Begbie’s doxological approach, it would be better 
characterized as a kerygmatic approach; that is, as a theology of music, it understands the 
role of the ecclesial practice of music as proclaiming the Word of God. Taking the 
Pauline dictum, fides ex auditu, seriously, this project assumes that the auditory practices 
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of the church should endeavor to proclaim faith in the Word of God. Yet music does not 
perform this role automatically; one cannot play any sort of music and presume that it 
fulfills this daunting and necessary task. Rather, the ecclesial practice of music requires 
critical dogmatic reflection in order to ensure its harmony with the divine logos. Thus the 
Word provides a normative function, as what ecclesial musical performance is supposed 
to achieve.  
Such an approach is in marked contrast with another recent contribution to 
contemporary theology of music, one which argues that a preoccupation with the 
normativity of the Word of God is something to be rejected, rather than fundamentally 
assumed. Jettisoning the dogmatic task within contemporary theology of music is Heidi 
Epstein’s Melting the Venusberg.53 Epstein challenges what she describes as a 
“logocentric,” male-dominated and idealist/metaphysical view of music in contemporary 
theologies of music.  
Epstein’s critique is, in the first analysis, credible. She describes a historically 
rooted “phallic rage for order” in which the desire for harmony becomes a moral demand 
for conformity at the expense of particularity.54 The thesis of Melting the Venusberg is 
that contemporary theologies of music assume such normativity without questioning the 
metaphysical and sexist assumptions underlying it.55 In the attempt to be adequate to the 
postmodern situation, then, Epstein dismisses the “sacramentalist worldview” as 
antiquated, opting instead for a “metaphorical” worldview. The former, she argues, 
attempts to describe the physical in terms of the metaphysical, whereas metaphors 
maintain symbolic connections within the concreteness of language.56 Although such 
desire for concreteness is laudable, Epstein too quickly equates a sacramental 
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understanding of the world with a metaphysical one. Critiquing the medieval 
understanding of music, Epstein asserts that the “harmony of the spheres” creates “a 
rhetoric of musical purity and danger,” which in turn leads to the principle of the primacy 
of text over music as an authoritarian attempt to discipline music’s more natural tendency 
to descend into chaos.57 In this respect Epstein utilizes a particularly graphic metaphor of 
text as a “chastity belt” intended to contain and preserve the purity of music. Such 
rhetoric “escalates into portraits of music as dangerously effeminizing.”58  
Epstein substantiates this claim with a smorgasbord of musico-misogynist 
references of theologians throughout church history who have informed the contemporary 
situation. She then dismisses entirely the dogmatic critique of musical practice, as it has 
too often been couched in “highly charged sexual rhetoric.”59 Epstein then traces how 
music has been a metaphor for sexual relations throughout church history, alongside the 
more metaphysical, neoplatonic symbolization. Preferring the more visceral and 
embodied description of what it is that music does, she faults other contemporary 
theologians for adopting the metaphysical assumptions of their predecessors, while 
ignoring the more particular issues of embodiment and identity. “Contemporary 
theologians have yet to reframe music as a technique of the self, even though the 
Presocratics and others intuitively recognised that music shaped personal and social 
identity.”60 Although her goal of a practical theology of music is commendable, and one 
which this dissertation identifies with, she misreads many contemporary theologians and 
apparently misunderstands much of traditional Christian doctrine. 
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Oskar Söhngen’s systematic theology of music is dismissed as “logocentric” on 
several grounds, one of which is his endorsal of the primacy of text over music. In 
addition, she accuses Söhngen’s “missionary position” of logocentrism from his 
implication that music may serve a kerygmatic function. Here Epstein provides an 
interesting contrast with Barth: music and proclamation are not to be related—not 
because music is not worthy of God’s Word, but God’s Word is apparently not worthy of 
music!61 Moreover, Epstein’s aversion for the most fundamental of traditional Christian 
doctrines is demonstrated by the following comment: “In addition to these constraining 
metaphysical lenses, further evidence of Söhngen’s hermeneutical conservatism lies in his 
use of the Trinity to structure further musico-theological inquiry.”62 If the Trinity is too 
“conservative” for Christian theology, then Epstein’s alternative resides within an entirely 
different theological conversation. For much of Christian theology, the Trinity is so 
fundamental that to deny it is to be doing something else entirely. 
Epstein also condemns Jeremy Begbie’s approach to musical temporality as 
overly kerygmatic and metaphysical. “Begbie’s attempt to expunge human ambivalence 
toward time is a modified form of the spiritual escapism through music that he rejects.”63 
If attending to the actual effects of music upon a listening subject’s sense of time is 
“escapist,” then one would be hard-pressed to find any approach to music that satisfies 
the demands of such a radical materialism. One must wonder what kind of music exists in 
an atemporal world; neither rhythm nor tonality could exist. It is, therefore, Epstein’s 
own critique that is “escapist.” Furthermore, Begbie is criticized for “shift[ing] his 
attention almost immediately to the divine.”64 Although theologies without God are not 
unheard of, Epstein fails to identify or connect with this contemporary a-theological 
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scene.65 Instead, she criticizes theologians who do talk about God, without properly 
justifying the alternative. 
Although in many respects she is correct in her critique of past approaches to 
theological reflection upon music, she unfortunately misdiagnoses the symptoms she 
describes so well. The problem with Christian theologies of music is not, as Epstein 
insists, the search for normative principles rooted in the divine logos, but rather the failure 
of many theologies to ground the doctrine of the Word in truly incarnational, concrete 
human terms.  
In contrast to the allegedly unrealistic theologies of music that she critiques, 
Epstein prefers to speak of music in terms of embodiment and subjectivity. In this respect 
she prefers what has been called the “New Musicology” of Susan McClary, in which 
music is described by means of metaphors that ascribe kinetic and bodily meanings to 
music.66 The position of this dissertation does not disagree with such a practical and 
embodied approach to the theology of music. Indeed, discussing the actual practice of 
music and how it affects persons in their practical lives and churches in their practical 
ministries is precisely what any properly incarnational theology of music should hope to 
achieve. Such theological realism would help assuage the “worship wars” and bring 
congregations to shared understandings of their practices. To reflect upon music in a 
critical manner—as proclamation of the divine Word incarnate in human flesh—that is 
the goal this dissertation endeavors to pursue. But such a goal cannot be achieved if the 
Word is discarded as “logocentric” and traditional Christian doctrine is jettisoned in favor 
of an a-theological programme. 
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The approach taken in this dissertation appreciates the turn toward sensuality 
taken in Epstein’s project. However, it rejects her method of divesting theology of the 
logos. An “incarnational” approach to theology does not mean divesting the flesh of the 
spirit, yet that is precisely what Epstein appears to claim. Rather, the incarnation brings 
the logos into the sensual world of tonality and rhythm (i.e. the very time that she rejects 
as metaphysical), redeeming them from meaninglessness and celebrating their 
particularity in God’s good creation. 
 
THE DOGMATIC TASK AND THE NORMATIVITY OF THE WORD 
It is the contention of this dissertation that critical theological reflection upon the ecclesial 
practice of music requires that it be set within the manifold redemptive work of the Word 
of God in Christ through the Church. The first task of this dissertation, then, is to 
establish that the ecclesial practice of music may serve in a proclamatory role, that it may 
proclaim the Word of God.  
Given Karl Barth’s contribution to the discussion of the relationship between 
proclamation and dogmatic theology, then, I will first examine Barth’s approach to the 
possibility of a musical proclamation and the dogmatic task that would provide normative 
guidance for the musical practice of the church. His approach, however, is a negative one. 
As will be demonstrated through an examination of his early works, Barth refuses to 
allow for dogmatic reflection upon the ecclesial practice of music. It is not that Barth 
rejects the idea of musical proclamation wholesale; as the oft-quoted Barthian adage goes, 
God may proclaim God’s Word through a “dead dog” if God so wishes. Rather, it will be 
shown how Barth severely restricts divinely commissioned proclamation to exclude the 
musical life and practice of the church. 
Barth’s restriction of proclamation, however, provides a foil for the work of Pope 
Benedict XVI. The third chapter focuses upon the latter’s assertion that music may indeed 
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proclaim the Word of God. After locating Benedict’s theology of music within the history 
of Catholic Christian reflection on the place of music within the life of the church, it will 
be demonstrated how the proclamation of the Word is the primary purpose of music. 
Benedict rightly acknowledges this and presents it in a coherent fashion for contemporary 
theology. 
The fourth chapter presents an assessment of Benedict’s dogmatic reflection upon 
music, attending particularly to the Apollonian-Dionysian paradigm he borrows from 
ancient and late modern aesthetic theory and reconfigures in a decidedly Christian 
fashion. The legacy of Kant’s analytic of the sublime will be contrasted with Augustine’s 
De Musica, in order to demonstrate how Benedict’s dogmatic approach to the ecclesial 
practice of music does not present an aesthetic of domination (as Godard and Epstein 
would aver), but rather an aesthetic of peace. Thus a Ratzingerian approach is advocated 
as the kind of kerygmatic theology of music called for by the present project. 
The conclusion, then, points toward possible means of critically examining the 
ecclesial practice of music further. A “descriptive” method of dogmatic reflection is 
finally recommended, in which the theology of music approximates a kind of journalistic 
“music criticism,” albeit one that listens for the Word of Christ, the hearing of which 
brings faith (Romans 10:17). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
KARL BARTH’S MUSICAL ICONOCLASM 
 
“God may speak to us through Russian 
Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming 
shrub, or a dead dog. We do well to listen to 
Him if He really does. But…we cannot say 
that we are commissioned to pass on what 
we have heard….”1 
 
A PRELUDE ON MOZART 
In seeking to understand Barth’s theological position regarding music, it is customary to 
first examine his flattery of Mozart, so often invoked with regard to “parables of the 
Kingdom.”2 It is well-known that Barth spent each morning listening to a half hour of 
Mozart’s music, and even published a few writings on the composer. A preliminary 
analysis would find that Barth’s thoughts on Mozart were not particularly deep; perhaps 
they would be better attributed to the more amusing side of Barth, the charming 
personality associated with pipe-smoking and clever witticisms, rather than the serious 
Reformed dogmatician. As one audience member at Barth’s bicentennial address on 
Mozart in Geneva described the event, it was “not with heavy solemnity but rather with 
not unmischievous good humor.”3 David Moseley, arguing against this view, writes: “The 
standard response of certain Barth scholars who care to comment on his musical 
passion—obsession, even—for Mozart is to make an amused observation of the fact, at 
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the level of obiter dicta, equivalent to that which is also frequently reserved for Barth’s 
well-known love of military history, detective novels, and his pipe.”4  
Furthermore, by his own attestation, he merely loved the sound of Mozart’s 
music. In fact, he refuted studies of Mozart that attempted to impart meaning upon his 
compositions.  
He does not reveal in his music any doctrine….Mozart does not wish to 
say anything: he just sings and sounds. Thus he does not force anything on 
the listener, does not demand that he make any decisions or take any 
positions; he simply leaves him free. Doubtless the enjoyment he gives 
begins with our accepting that.5 
 
Barth’s love of Mozart is largely rooted in his belief that Mozart is not saying anything. 
The music is pure praise of God, with no meaningful content besides enjoyment.6 
Theodore Gill recounts a tour of Barth’s office in Basel, well-known to have been 
adorned with portraits of both Calvin and Mozart. “‘My special revelation,’ he smiled, 
looking at Calvin. ‘And my general revelation,’ he said, as he beamed at Mozart.’”7 Gill 
poses the question whether this joke was meaningless or if it masked a more serious view 
of the place of music within Barth’s systematized worldview. Unfortunately, Gill quickly 
abandons the particulars of this quote to speculate on a Barthian theology of the arts in 
general. 
As other scholars have demonstrated, however, music was indeed a crucial 
element in Barth’s theology. This chapter will add to this scholarly material by locating 
the genesis of Barth’s critical use of the Auftrag (otherwise known as the “great 
commission”) in his correspondence with a pastor on the subject of the status and role of 
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liturgical music. Before proceeding to this task, however, it will first review Barth’s 
writings on Mozart and their role in his concern with natural theology. 
 
Freedom in Barth’s appreciation of Mozart 
Barth’s writings on Mozart present a normative musical aesthetic in which freedom, as set 
within the limits of creation, is celebrated and explored. Barth addressed music toward 
the beginning of his lectures on Protestant theology in the nineteenth century. In a section 
entitled, “Man in the Eighteenth Century,” Barth provides a broad overview of the 
intellectual and cultural currents preceding his primary subject matter.8 It is here that 
Barth presents the claim that one can better understand a historical period by an 
awareness of the music of that period.  
We can study the history of a past age, we can contemplate its architectural 
and other works of art, its portraits and its dress, and we can read the 
books it gave us, but we cannot hear the voices of the people then living—
and this imposes a tremendous limitation upon our understanding—except 
as they are transcribed and laid before us in their music in so far as it has 
been handed down to us.9 
 
This concern for the formal, aesthetic voice of the past is curious. As will be shown 
below, Barth later exhibited very little concern for similar formal aspects of revelation. 
For Barth, the music of the eighteenth century is perhaps more definitive of the spirit of 
that century than music of other centuries: “there is something in the way in which it was 
musical which is so characteristic of the whole spirit of the age.”10 He finds that 
eighteenth century musicians were more craftsmen than artists or composers, in that 
through their proficiency with sounds, they could craft the created order and thus 
celebrate the mastery of humanity over nature. This mastery was “the sovereign attitude 
which they had first of all towards the instrument producing the sounds and then to the 
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abundance of possibilities inherent in these sounds.”11 Barth utilizes strong active verbs to 
describe the work of the musician: “forcing, imposing and stamping” the “mass of 
possible sounds.”12 
But while the “world of sound” is mastered in this way, it also becomes an arena 
for game-playing. The eighteenth century composer plays with sound, enjoying the 
freedom of being its master. This distinguishes Mozart from both his predecessors and his 
followers. Earlier music tried too hard to “subdue the raw material of sound” and 
composers after Beethoven did not love sound enough “for its own sake” and therefore 
could not properly play the “game” that is music.13 
Barth makes one more move, however, in analysing the music of the eighteenth 
century. Beyond the infinite sea of playfulness, there is a shore. Barth does not hear Bach, 
Handel, Gluck or Haydn acknowledging this shore at all. In Mozart, however, he hears 
the limitations of play. “[Mozart] had in addition something entirely personal to himself: 
the sadness or horror inherent in the knowledge of the border before which absolutist 
man…stands in blissful unawareness.”14 Barth even draws a comparison between Mozart 
and his Don Giovanni, who continues to play despite his awareness of his mortality as the 
Commodore’s statue stands before him.15 
Barth’s aesthetic of musical freedom also appears later in his career, in an essay 
devoted to “Mozart’s Freedom,” as part of the bicentennial celebration of Mozart’s birth 
in January 1956. In this essay, Barth outlines two “riddles in the phenomenon that is 
Mozart.” The first of these regards Mozart’s reception of musical skill from among his 
colleagues, past and present, as well as his creative appropriation of those skills. With the 
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technical ability that Mozart has received, he is able to configure and reconfigure the 
sonic dimension of the created order in a free and creative manner.16 The second “riddle” 
concerns more specific musicological details. Here Barth attempts to get inside Mozart’s 
music, describing its particular accomplishments. “Mozart’s music always sounds 
unburdened, effortless, and light. This is why it unburdens, releases, and liberates us.”17 
While Barth does not provide a conventional musicological description, he tells us what 
he hears when listening to Mozart. This indeed is helpful for understanding the mind of 
Barth (much more than understanding Mozart!). 
 
Barth’s musical aesthetic and natural theology 
Musicologically, Barth’s reflections on Mozart are hardly unique. As Philip Stoltzfus’ 
dissertation has aptly demonstrated, Barth was working within an aesthetic framework 
that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and had continued to develop well into the 
twentieth.18 Stoltzfus identifies Barth’s musical aesthetic with the “formalism” of Eduard 
Hanslick, as well as the Neue Sachlichkeit (“new objectivism”) movement of the early 
1920s.19 Writing throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, Hanslick attempted 
to purge musicological discussions of their romantic preoccupations with emotional 
expression.20 He achieved this by grounding the content of music in “tonally moving 
forms.”21 Such musical “formalism” eschewed the idea that music had any kind of 
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meaning or reference outside of itself.22 There are also notable similarities with the Neue 
Sachlichkeit, a movement that followed upon the heels of expressionist painting in the 
1920s.23 Fritz Schmalenbach, writing in 1936, located Neue Sachlichkeit’s “innermost 
kernel” in “a radical rejection of all emotional bias, a deliberately cultivated 
unsentimentality….”24 Thus Barth was not unique in his musicological observations. 
As Thomas Erne has noted, however, the uniqueness of Barth’s reflections on 
Mozart is to be found in the theological nature of those reflections.25 More specifically, 
these reflections should be located within Barth’s larger rejection of natural theology and 
the analogia entis.26 In short, the analogia entis is the “analogy of being,” in which the 
existence and characteristics of being imply the existence and characteristics of God. Its 
theological genesis is to be found in jumbled form in Thomas Aquinas’ work, and 
unfortunately misunderstood in Cajetan’s later efforts toward clarification.27 Protestant 
scholastics attempted to appropriate this analogy, with varying success, but it was Barth 
who finally severed the connection.28 
Barth’s rejection of the analogia entis emerged in his critique of Roman 
Catholicism, although he soon aimed at his own tradition vis-à-vis Emil Brunner’s 
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espousal of a human “capacity” (-mächtigkeit; -fähigkeit) for revelation as well.29 Barth 
argued that humanity possesses nothing of its own that can grasp any knowledge of 
God.30 To affirm such would be tantamount to affirm Feuerbach’s critique of the essence 
of Christianity—that it is purely man-made.31 In his preface to the first volume of the 
massive Kirchliche Dogmatik, Barth adamantly refused to go the course of the analogia 
entis. “I have had no option but to say No at this point. I regard the analogia entis as the 
invention of the Antichrist….”32  
Barth emphasizes rather the sovereignty of God in providing any possibility for 
such knowledge. George Hunsinger has classified this emphasis as an “objectivist motif,” 
in which the basis for knowledge of God “lies not in human subjectivity but in God.”33 In 
Barth’s own words, 
The possibility of a real knowledge by natural man of the true God, 
derived from creation, is, according to Calvin, a possibility in principle, 
but not in fact, not a possibility to be realised by us. One might call it an 
objective possibility, created by God, but not a subjective possibility, open 
to man. Between what is possible in principle and what is possible in fact 
there inexorably lies the fall.34 
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Barth would later systematize this theological epistemology into a doctrine of faith, in 
which religious knowledge is gained from a response to revelation.   
The possibility of faith as it is given to man in the reality of faith can be 
understood only as one that is loaned to man by God, and loaned 
exclusively for use. The moment we regard it as a possibility which is in 
some sense man’s own, the opposite statement regarding man’s incapacity 
comes back into force.35 
 
Thus Barth’s theological epistemology—his understanding of the source of knowledge of 
God—leads away from the analogia entis and toward his trademark analogia fidei.  
Given such a strong aversion to placing theological value in human activity, it is 
remarkable that Barth manages to heap such praise upon Mozart. Some have postulated 
whether the writings on Mozart present a cautious step back toward the realm of natural 
theology.36 Indeed Stoltzfus remarks, “any seemingly ‘anthropological’ preoccupation 
with the medium of music initially strikes one as a highly paradoxical aspect of [Barth’s] 
thinking….”37 But both Stoltzfus and Moseley have shown that Barth’s musical aesthetic 
is actually consistent with his rejection of natural theology. In valuing the freedom of 
Mozart’s music within the limits of creation, and by denying any expression of meaning 
to music, Barth grants to Mozart a refuge away from the threatening task of daring to 
proclaim the logos. Nowhere does Barth claim that Mozart’s music proclaims the Word; 
rather, Mozart’s music is found entirely within the created order, celebrating the limits 
that it finds there. In Moseley’s words, “Barth’s constant theme with Mozart is that his 
music was the sounding forth of the ‘self-attestation’ of creation as a witness, not as a 
presumptuous ‘revelation’.”38 And in those of Stoltzfus, “Within Mozart’s compositional 
structures, Barth finds a uniquely objective and ‘free’ voicing of the ordering harmony of 
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creation. This relationship then stands, for Barth, not as any sort of opening for natural 
theology, but rather as a parallel analogy, or ‘parable’, for the beautiful ‘Gestalt’ or 
‘Form’ of God’s objectivity and freedom as actualized in Jesus Christ.”39 In such a 
manner, then, Barth’s “formalist” musical aesthetic, as found throughout his reflections 
on Mozart, was integrally related to his eschewal of natural theology. In adopting such an 
aesthetic, Barth preserved within his theology a place for music that never verged on the 
idolatrous. 
 While Barth’s writings on Mozart do indeed provide an illuminating perspective 
on the possibilities of music within the limits of creation, they are of little assistance to 
the project undertaken here—which seeks normative guidance for the ecclesial practice of 
music. Along with his turn from natural theology and the analogia entis, Barth also 
turned from the larger tradition of the church in reflecting upon its own musical practices. 
 
DEFINING DOGMATICS IN GÖTTINGEN, 1924 
Utilizing his own definition of theology, that of a critical science for the church’s own 
self-examination, it becomes clear that Barth indeed has no theology of music. In fact, he 
outrightly refuses the possibility. Not content with this theological situation, this chapter 
will now examine how and why Barth takes such a dogmatically iconoclastic position 
toward music. Put simply, Barth’s critical use of a revelatory dialectic prohibits a 
proclamatory role for music, thus preventing any critical theological reflection upon 
music as an ecclesial practice. Further, this “critical use” of revelation is made evident in 
his use of the Great Commission, and I hope to show how this move of restricting the 
scope of proclamation emerged out of a specific struggle to cope with the theological 
challenges of church music. 
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Dogmatics and the Word of God 
Even before Barth began his first series of lectures in dogmatics, he lamented the broad 
application of dogmatics to forms of Christian activity other than preaching. In his 
lectures on Schleiermacher’s theology, delivered in the winter of 1923-24, he claimed: 
“Dogmatic language has [unfortunately] been shaped gradually on the basis of the other 
public utterances of religion—the poetic and oratorical.”40 In the same section, he 
dismissed Schleiermacher’s high regard for music in the Christmas Eve dialogue, since 
music is “rated above speech and silent devotion above both.”41 So even in the winter of 
1924 there is in Barth a preference for the spoken word above other sonic phenomena.  
In his Göttingen dogmatic lectures, which began in May of that year, he would 
clarify his position on the relationship—or lack thereof—between dogmatics and music. 
Barth did not dislike music; he was just not concerned with it, at least not as an object of 
dogmatic reflection. Writing to his friend Eduard Thurneysen at the time, Barth described 
the “primary object” of such dogmatics as “neither biblical theology nor church doctrine, 
nor faith, nor religious awareness, but Christian preaching as it is actually given. This can 
be recognized as the ‘Word of God’ (which is the aim of the exercise).”42 Thus Barth’s 
practical starting point for these lectures was to provide a guide for the pastor’s task of 
preparing and preaching sermons. Barth elevated Christian speech above other Christian 
activities, the basis of which is in his emphasis on the Word of God as the proper object 
of dogmatic reflection.43 
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Barth begins these lectures with a definition of dogmatics as “scientific reflection 
on the Word of God,” emphasizing his continuity with the modern theological tradition 
(including Schleiermacher, Hermann and Troeltsch).44 Ever since the early nineteenth 
century, when Schleiermacher had reconfigured theology as a science (both internally and 
externally in relation to other disciplines), theologians had struggled with the fundamental 
definitions of their labor.45 Barth locates himself within this tradition, accepting 
dogmatics as a science, but augments this affirmation with a proviso that science is 
defined by “the closest possible adjustment of knowledge to the distinctiveness of its 
object.”46 Therefore, the object of a science entirely determines the science—its methods, 
norms, practices, and so on. 
Also keeping with the modern theological tradition, Barth is aware that God 
cannot be the object of any science. This was made impossible by Kant’s critique of 
metaphysics. But then Barth’s dissent from the modern theological tradition emerges. For 
he will not identify the object of dogmatics with the relationship between a church and its 
teaching (Schleiermacher), the origin and validity of religion (Herrmann), or even the 
Christian faith (Troeltsch, Schweizer), but rather the Word of God.47 Not God, but God’s 
Word—the divine act of speaking and thereby revealing Godself—is to be the object of 
dogmatic reflection. Barth argues that this provides the only proper object of a distinctly 
Reformed dogmatics.48  
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The Word of God as Proclamation  
After establishing the proper object of dogmatic reflection as the Word of God, Barth 
introduces his paradigmatic division of that divine Word in threefold form. The first 
address of God’s speaking a Word (Deus dixit) is one “in which God himself and God 
alone is the speaker,” the Word of God as revealed in Christ. The second address is one 
“in which it is the Word of a specific category of people (the prophets and apostles),” or 
the Word of God as scripture. The third address is one “in which the number of its human 
agents or proclaimers is theoretically unlimited.” This latter form he calls (here in the 
Göttingen Dogmatics) “preaching.” Thus preaching is itself a form of the continuing 
revelation of God’s Word.49 The threefold pattern here is pressed into conformity with the 
credal formulas, as Barth interweaves his paradigm with the Nicene Creed on the 
incarnation, and the Western pneumatology of dual procession:  
The Word of God on which dogmatics reflects…is one in three and three 
in one:…the Word of God as revelation, the Word of God as scripture, and 
the Word of God as preaching, neither to be confused nor separated. One 
Word of God, one authority, one power, and yet not one but three 
addresses. Three addresses of God…, yet not three Words of God, three 
authorities, truths, or powers, but one. Scripture is not revelation, but from 
revelation. Preaching is not revelation or scripture, but from both.50 
 
Bruce McCormack has also indicated the christological elements in the second and third 
forms of revelation: 
Revelation is an act of God’s grace in which He takes up the creaturely 
media of scripture and preaching and gives to them a capacity that they do 
not possess in and for themselves to bear adequate witness to God. In that 
this occurs, the media correspond to revelation itself. In this relation of 
correspondence, they participate actualistically in that primary form of 
unity-in-differentiation which is Jesus Christ. They obtain a share in God’s 
act of self-revelation.51 
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It is telling that at this point in Barth’s theological career, the third form is not yet 
“proclamation,” but “preaching.” Although terms such as kerygma and Verkündigung are 
occasionally used, it is preaching which alone constitutes the third form of the Word of 
God. Preaching is the Word of God spoken in and to the church in the present day; 
preaching is the object of the scientific reflection called dogmatics. “This phenomenon of 
Christian speaking, whether by Christianity, in its name, for its extension or 
establishment, or however we might put it, is as it were the raw stuff of dogma and 
dogmatics. As such it is our methodological starting point.”52 Years later in the Church 
Dogmatics, this “raw stuff” or “raw material” (German: Stoff) would be augmented with 
the sacraments to become “proclamation,” but in Göttingen Barth was only concerned 
with preaching. 
In fact, Barth considers this task to define ecclesiology as a whole, as the church is 
fundamentally the location where the Word of God is preached. “But what always makes 
it the church, what distinguishes it from any other fellowship of faith and spirit and 
distinctive orientation and sacrament, is the vital link between this very specific hearing 
and making heard, the Word which it receives and passes on.”53 This is not to say that he 
did not consider the various other activities of the Christian church. But they are not the 
Word of God, and it is that Word that constitutes the object of dogmatics. 
To the degree that the Christian church is something other than the 
fellowship of hearing and speaking God’s Word, to the degree that it is, for 
example, a free society of like-minded souls, to the degree that it 
participates more or less adequately in all kinds of educational and cultural 
work, to the degree that it includes in its activity the sacred dance and 
reverent silence, the mystery play and the Christ or Luther film, it still 
cannot escape the task of reflection, and it must take note how this turns 
out. But it does not need dogma and dogmatics, for this reflection relates 
to the Christian church to the degree that it can and should intend to speak. 
Dogmatics is very specifically reflection on this speaking with reference to 
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the Word of God, namely, how far the Word of God is, or is meant to be, 
identical with it.54 
 
Thus Barth admits the necessity of reflecting upon these extra-homiletical activities, but 
such reflection is different from dogmatic reflection, because the act of preaching alone 
involves—constitutes—the Word of God as spoken and heard today. 
 
Proclamation and the revelatory dialectic 
As elucidated above with reference to natural theology, Barth invokes a dialectical 
tension between God’s Word and the works of humans, so that the idea of coherence 
between any human act and that of the divine marks the height of presumption. 
Might not other human voices proclaim this Word too, and do they not do 
so by common experience? Does not God speak through nature too, 
through history, through Handel’s Largo and all kinds of good art? And 
can we say that God does not speak directly to people today? No, we 
cannot, is the obvious answer. As Calvin says, God is not tied to such aids 
or such inferior means, and as the East Frisian preachers…say similarly, 
God’s work is not tied to ours.55 
 
Even the claim that preaching might communicate the divine Word is nearly impossible 
to justify. To the extent that God’s Word is present and active in human affairs, it is also 
quite hidden in those affairs. One cannot identify this or that particular event as God’s act. 
For if the coherence is between God’s Word and human action is assured, the critical 
function of dogmatics is unnecessary. Only one particular event is assured for Barth, of 
course, and that is the event of Jesus Christ, the incarnation of the Word. 
This identification of preaching as a part of—or extension of—divine revelation 
by means of the incarnation, however, is not easily achieved. Furthermore, the hiddenness 
of the divine Word is not just limited to that Word in preaching, but each member of the 
threefold paradigm. 
                                                 
54
 GD I, 25. 
55
 GD I, 33. 
35 
Preaching, of course, is God’s Word in human words, concealed by the 
total inability of everything human to attain to this object, just as God’s 
Word in scripture is concealed by the separating distance of everything 
historical, by Lessing’s “ugly ditch,” and just as God’s Word in revelation 
is concealed by God’s inaccessibility, by his incomprehensibility, which 
does not cease but becomes very great in his revelation.56 
 
This “dialectic of veiling and unveiling,” in which the presence of God’s Word 
includes its hiddenness, has recently been identified by Bruce McCormack as the 
“material principle” of Barth’s dogmatics.57 McCormack has argued that Barth’s 
methodological discussions in the Göttingen Dogmatics are incomplete. For—despite his 
protests against using “material principles” such as Schleiermacher’s “feeling of absolute 
dependence”—Barth employed a similar material principle in this “dialectic of veiling 
and unveiling.” Also in ways similar to Schleiermacher, Barth employed this principle 
both critically and heuristically. The critical use of this material dialectic principle assists 
in his “establishing the limits of what can be said within the realm of dogmatics”; the 
heuristic use guides him in “assimilating the witness of Holy Scripture to particular 
doctrinal themes and the witness of tradition to that witness.”58 In other words, the 
veiling/unveiling dialectic active in Barth’s doctrine of revelation serves to fix or restrain 
the kinds of practices considered contiguous with the divine Word (the critical function) 
on the one hand, and serves as the interpretive glue that keeps the Word of God in 
scripture together with the tradition that follows. Understood in this critical and heuristic 
way, then, Barth’s dialectic of veiling/unveiling curiously allows, while also prohibiting, 
claims of the church’s participation in the ministry of the Word of God. The hidden 
presence of the Word, as a critical principle, is suspicious of any claims of such 
participation, but by its very nature must also admit that the Word demands such 
participation.  
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McCormack’s identification of this “material principle” is indeed helpful for 
properly configuring the necessity and possibility of proclaiming the very Word of God. 
What has perhaps been overlooked in McCormack’s study, however, is the imperative 
element in Barth’s use of this unconscious principle. In the Göttingen Dogmatics, the 
only reason Barth offers for the participation of preaching in this Word is a command 
(Auftrag) that proceeds from the Word of God in its second form, that of scripture.59 
Specifically, he refers to Mark 16.15, “po reuq e,n te j  eivj  to .n  k o,sm on  a [p a n ta  k h ru,xa te to . 
euva gge,l io n  p a ,sh| th/| k ti,s ei,” and 1 Corinthians 9.16, “avna ,g kh  ga,r  m o i evp i, kei ta i\ ouva i. 
g a ,r m oi, evs tin  eva .n  m h. euv a g gel i,sw m a i.”60 This command is never invoked negatively, 
with respect to the limiting of dogmatics’ scope (although it will later provide such a 
critical function). It is used here, however, simply to substantiate his claim that preaching 
is commanded. It is the underlying dialectic of veiling and unveiling that says “no” to the 
range of human action, while leaving room for exceptions; it is the command of scripture 
that positively identifies such an exception. John the Baptist may extend the index finger 
toward the crucified Christ in Grünewald’s macabre altarpiece, but for Barth it is Christ 
himself who points toward the pulpit. 
 
Proclamation as anaesthetic 
A crucial aspect of Barth’s conception of the Word of God, however, is that it is void of 
any superfluous aesthetic form. The Word does not concern itself with oratorical 
flourishes, poetic devices, or anything one might associate with performance. The Word, 
as Word, consists of the communication of meaning in and through propositional, 
linguistic structures.61 “The Christian church begins by listening to the address of the 
prophets and apostles, which was not babbled, or mimed, or put to music, or danced, but 
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spoken and written in statements and groups of statements.”62 At one point Barth likens 
the situation of the preacher disposed to impressive oratory to Gorgias, the rhetorician in 
Plato’s dialogue of the same name. Plato’s Socrates challenges and embarrasses Gorgias, 
dismissing the skills of rhetoric as “not an art, but the occupation of a shrewd and 
enterprising spirit, and of one naturally skilled in its dealings with men, and in sum and 
substance I call it ‘flattery’.”63 As a Socrates for the twentieth century, Barth is not 
interested in how convincing or dramatic a preacher may be, but only how well the 
preacher can create the proper combination of lexical and grammatical elements, 
producing a structure through which God communicates.  
Stephen Webb demonstrates in his study of Barth’s own rhetoric that he often 
employed a technique known as “realism”: “Realism pretends to be…a rejection of 
rhetoric, while in actuality it is merely another kind of rhetoric, one which orders itself to 
some (rhetorically constructed) view of reality.”64 It is, then, somewhat ironic that Barth 
would dismiss the art of rhetoric in theology, given that he is such a rhetorician himself.65  
Aware of potential criticism regarding the matter of extra-linguistic preaching, 
Barth offers three facts to substantiate his claim. He appeals to the dogmatic tradition of 
referring to credal formulas, he cites the abundance of homiletic material on which 
dogmatics may reflect, and emphasizes the need for preaching to be so scrutinized.66 
Neither of these rationales, however, provides adequate grounds for excising the structure 
of a text from its delivery and prohibiting the larger range of Christian practices from 
participating in the ministry of the Word. That dogmatics have traditionally referred to 
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credal formulas does not address the possibility that they could perhaps do more. After 
all, tradition is always under construction, particularly for the Reformed tradition. The 
same logical critique applies to Barth’s claim that the dogmatician has such a ready 
supply of sermons that she need not look elsewhere for material to critique. A plenitude 
of sermons does not obviate the need to assess the other activities of the church. 
Furthermore, the necessity of scrutinizing sermons hardly abrogates the necessity of 
scrutinizing those other activities. Barth can prove that preaching is positively 
commanded in scripture by means of the Auftrag—there is no question there. But Barth is 
still struggling to legitimize the exclusivity of his dogmatic attention on preaching. 
The positive use of the Auftrag, like the dialectical principle identified by 
McCormack, is repeated in the 1927 dogmatics.67 Barth discusses the command to preach 
in section five, but again with reference to the necessity of preaching, not the restriction 
of dogmatic reflection.68 A more negative use of the Auftrag, however, would emerge 
specifically in regards to music. This occurred in Barth’s correspondence with a German 
pastor in the spring of 1930, just prior to embarking upon his study of Anselm. In this 
correspondence, Barth stumbles upon a more negative, critical use of the Auftrag. Not 
only are preaching and the sacraments positively commanded, but dogmatic attention to 
music (and consequently all other Christian practices) is rejected.  
 
A NEW DIMENSION FOR THE AUFTRAG, 1930 
Critical use of the Auftrag 
On 14 March 1930, Walter Kiefner, a Stadtpfarrer (pastor) in the Swabian city of Ulm, 
sent a letter to Barth challenging the latter’s position on several matters related to music 
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and its place in the ministry of the Word of God.69 He had already published two essays 
on sacred music, both of which he included with his letter—one on the meaning of the 
Singbewegung (“singing movement,” a revival of folk traditions that impacted on the 
early twentieth century liturgical reforms), and the other on the use of the organ in the 
worship life of the church.70 
In “Die Orgel im Gottesdienst,” Kiefner responded to various attacks on the 
organ, calling out Barth in particular. “A theological teacher, one respected by the 
younger generation of theologians and one who especially knows the various Reformers, 
is said to have said in lecture: ‘In our churches a terrible monster stands: the organ.’”71 
Kiefner was referring here to Barth, most probably to a statement reflected in the 
Göttingen Dogmatics: “A formidable and even demonic instrument, the organ, is also 
active….”72 In his defense against the disparagement of the instrument, Kiefner argued 
that the organ’s justification was to be found in its unique role—one that neither the 
minister nor the community can perform in its absence. The organ, he argued, takes 
“wood and metal, air and electricity”—things of the created order that in themselves are 
incapable of proclaiming the divine Word—and brings them into participation with that 
ministry. Under the hands of the organist, then, these elements “begin to cooperate with 
the event of sound related to the Word; they begin to speak.”73 In this manner, the organ 
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“begins to speak from its nature, it becoming…the second pulpit.”74 Barth responded by 
first deflecting the issue with characteristic hyperbole:  
“A rejection of sacred music, and the organ especially, is for my part out 
of the question. What I desire is to reach fundamentally clearer insight into 
the matter of the worship service. Only with this intention do I 
occasionally investigate the subject of both the iconoclasts and/or 
organoclasts of the sixteenth century. And truly, I have not called the 
organ a “terrible monster” (that is a myth)—but only an instrument once 
inhabited by uncanny demons, and its use in the worship service would 
thus have to be done with at least a clear conscience.”75  
 
Barth soon became serious, however, in delineating what is properly considered 
“proclamation” and what is not.  
In that same essay, Kiefner had conceded that in the worship service the organ is 
not necessary. However, on the basis of his reading of 1 Corinthians 6:12, “Pa ,n ta  m oi 
e;xe st in  a vl l V  ouv p a,n ta  su m fe,r ei,” he appealed to a Pauline notion of Christian freedom. 
Thus the organ may not be necessary, but it “is justified…insofar as it ‘is beneficial’ 
[nützt], i.e. that it becomes subservient to the events of the worship service.”76 In addition, 
Kiefner invoked a phrase of Luther’s: “God speaks with us through his Word, and we 
again speak with him through prayer and praise.”77 Barth’s response, however, adds a 
new dimension to his use of the Auftrag. 
Barth writes that “we are not to ask what in any case can happen in the Christian 
worship service, for the sake of Christian freedom, but rather, what should happen 
according to the nature of the church, according to the commission (Auftrag) that has 
become the church.”78 The Auftrag serves here not just to command the church into its 
mission and purpose, but also to limit the church’s practices. “That the creature, entirely 
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incapable of the Word, could and should praise and make offerings to God with men, is a 
thing for itself. I am not of the opinion that the Word of God is to be restricted to the oral 
sermon of the Church. Thank goodness that is not the case. Nevertheless I ask: what is 
commanded of the church as such?”79 
This negative use of the Auftrag strengthens the “critical” use of the dialectic of 
veiling and unveiling, which McCormack has himself unveiled as the “material principle” 
at work in Barth’s dogmatics. But Barth did not stumble upon this negative, critical use 
until he was challenged by Kiefner’s appeal to Christian freedom. Again, Barth is not 
concerned with what can happen in genuine worship. Music may indeed proclaim the 
logos, but for him the Auftrag has already established a specific agenda, with no room for 
redaction.  
Following this point, then, Barth is able to distinguish sharply between 
proclamation and doxology, between God’s Word and human words.  
It seems indispensable to me to distinguish fundamentally between the 
proclaimed Word commanded of the church as the exclusive 
representation of the divine revelation in the worship service on the one 
hand, and all the elements representing the human answer to divine 
revelation—doxology, confession, praise and thanksgiving—on the other. 
As Luther’s words, so excellently quoted by you, show: “God speaks with 
us through his Word, and we again speak with him through prayer and 
praise!80 
 
In this manner, then, Barth has deconstructed Kiefner’s appropriation of Luther to 
distinguish between musical praise and the proclaimed logos. Kiefner’s own approach 
was consistent with a heuristic use of the revelatory dialectic, in which the veiling and 
unveiling of the logos shapes the ecclesial practice of music. But Barth’s critical 
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development of that dialectic unearthed strict boundaries upon what practices the Church 
may perform.  
For Barth God’s Word and its human response are not consubstantial; they are 
two different things altogether. They may be homogenous, in that they both find their 
origin in God’s Word—but they are not identical. The human response in doxology and 
confession is just that: a human response. The practices involved in this response never 
reach such heights as preaching and the sacraments, since—by means of the exclusive 
Auftrag—they are not commissioned. “To construct a likeness and symbol of God is, 
besides just sermon and sacrament, not commanded but rather quite forbidden to us.”81 
One may engage in these activities, to be sure, but never claim too much for them.  
Furthermore, Barth emphasizes that the church “does not understand itself from 
itself….”82 The church, as a commissioned enterprise, is God’s work. It is God’s Word 
that comprises the church, so all other human words—even if spoken as part of worship 
in prayer and thanksgiving—are not to be thought of as church practices. The only true 
church practices are those that are commissioned: preaching and the sacraments.  
It may be useful here to examine the German word, Auftrag. According to 
Cassell’s German Dictionary, the term is consistent with the English understanding of 
“commission.” It may be conceived in terms of an order or instruction, a charge or 
mandate, but also as a fee for services handled by someone else. When used in 
conjunction with some prepositions, it may convey the sense of doing something “by 
order of” or “on behalf of” someone.83 So the Auftrag as described by Barth is something 
done by the church for God, but also in an important sense, it is done by God. Hunsinger 
may be helpful on this point, in his description of the unique character of such “double 
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agency”: “The event in which divine and human actions coincide, in which they exist in 
differentiated unity—the event of fellowship according to the mystery of the 
Chalcedonian pattern—is regarded as an event that is absolutely unique in kind.”84 
Barth closes his letter with a reference to Kiefner’s characterization of the organ 
as the “second pulpit,” but does not elaborate—he cordially notes that they disagree, and 
that it would be in Kiefner’s interests to reconsider. The “second pulpit” does reappear, 
however, in §3 of the Church Dogmatics, as Barth attacks the notion that any other 
practices might rival preaching and the sacraments as forms of proclamation.85 
 
The Auftrag in the Church Dogmatics 
When the first volume of the Church Dogmatics appeared in the year following this 
correspondence, Walter Kiefner must have immediately noticed its similarity with his 
correspondence with Barth.86 In that volume, Barth took careful steps to delineate what is 
and what is not proper “proclamation,” thereby limiting the scope of his dogmatic 
reflections. To be sure, Barth opened up proclamation to include the sacraments—
something that had not been done in his earlier Göttingen lectures. In §3 of The Doctrine 
of the Word of God, proclamation consists of both preaching and the sacraments, the 
former defined as “the attempt by someone…to express in his own words and make 
intelligible…the promise of the revelation, reconciliation and vocation of God as they are 
to be expected here and now.”87 Thus preaching consists of the human expression of the 
faith that results from God’s threefold revelation. The latter consists of the “symbolical 
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act…in accompaniment and confirmation of preaching….”88 Barth expands the scope of 
proclamation, even though the focus remains on preaching as it is “accompanied” and 
“confirmed.” Why this ever so slight loosening of the Barthian grip? The Auftrag 
provides him with a biblical mandate to do so. 
Invoking Matthew 28:19-20, Barth subjects proclamation to the authority of the 
Auftrag.89 “p or euq e,n tej  o u= n  m aq h teu ,sa te p a ,n ta  ta . e;q nh (  ba p ti,z on tej a u vto u.j  eivj  to . 
o ;n om a  tou/ p a tr o.j  k a i. tou / u i`ou/ ka i. tou/ a `g i,o u p neu,m a to j ( di da ,sko n tej a u vto u.j  th rei /n  
p a ,n ta  o [sa  evneteila ,m h n  u`m i/n \  k a i. ivdou . evgw . m eq V u`m w/n  eivm i p a ,sa j  ta .j  h`m e,ra j  e[w j  th/j  
s un tele i,a j  tou / a ivw /n oj Å” In this passage Barth found how the continued revelation of 
God’s Word in Christ is intrinsically related to the ongoing work of the church. The 
making of disciples, therefore, consists of baptizing and teaching; neither celebrating the 
Eucharist nor singing praises to God are even included in this strictly circumscribed 
commission.90 Proclamation is defined here not by Barth’s teaching duties (as at 
Göttingen), but by the commission of Christ, as mediated through scripture. It is the 
Incarnate Word itself, through the first “address” of Christ and the second “address” of 
scripture, that defines the scope of the third “address.”  
The positive use of the Auftrag, however, was not new. As shown above, the 
Auftrag had already been positively invoked in The Göttingen Dogmatics in order to 
establish preaching’s role as proclamation. A new, critical and negative use of the Auftrag 
appears, however, as Barth restricts the commission of proclamation to preaching and the 
sacraments: “God may speak to us through Russian Communism, a flute concerto, a 
blossoming shrub, or a dead dog. We do well to listen to Him if He really does. But…we 
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cannot say that we are commissioned to pass on what we have heard….”91 He does not 
refuse the possibility of proclamation occurring through other means, because that would 
compromise the sovereignty of God. God’s Word may say whatever, wherever, and 
whenever God wishes. But the church need not concern itself with any of these things; it 
is the Auftrag, and the Auftrag alone, that concerns the church. 
The move from Matthew 28 to an ecclesiology in toto is characteristic of Barth’s 
theology. In describing a motif of “particularism” in Barth, George Hunsinger points out 
that Barth nearly always moves “from the particular to the general rather than from the 
general to the particular.”92 This motif is manifested in places like these reflections on the 
Auftrag, where particular biblical passages move to construct more general theological 
claims. 
 
DOGMATIC REFLECTION AS IMPRACTICALLY CONCRETE 
Barth’s initial definition of dogmatics, then, as the “scientific reflection on the word of 
God,” never changed.93 Thus the relationship between dogmatics and proclamation was 
secure by May 1924. But the negative, critical element increased at the turn of the decade. 
Barth, like Schleiermacher, takes dogmatics out of an abstract realm and applies it to 
concrete practices.94 This is in contrast to much of the dogmatic tradition, which focuses 
on abstract, “timeless” dogmas. Gerhard Ebeling’s historical study of dogmatics uncovers 
an original “philosophical, linguistic usage,” in which faith is relegated to thought rather 
than practice.95 Ebeling credits the Reformation for uncovering the question “whether 
there does not inhere in [such abstract] dogmatics a tendency toward self-representation 
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and perfection that is difficult to harmonize with the serving function that should 
determine all theological work….”96 Barth’s restriction of the scope of dogmatic 
reflection, however, does limit this concrete and practical function of theology. Preaching 
and the sacraments are assisted, to be sure, but only as they are lifted out of their liturgical 
context and made even more abstract. 
Such criticism of Barth has become popular in recent years, as theologians such as 
Reinhard Hütter and Stanley Hauerwas have sought the means to make theology more 
concrete.97 Nicholas Healy has diagnosed Barth’s ecclesiology as bearing the weight of a 
fundamental “Christological-primacy rule,” which “requires that we understand 
ecclesiology to be a function of Christology.”98 However, Healy has gradually come to 
appreciate this heavily christological element in Barth’s ecclesiology, in that it leans 
toward consistency of the church’s practices with God’s action, rather than emphasizing 
human agency (and thereby endangering the church of succumbing to “the intrusion of 
alien principles, practices or beliefs”).99 Healy has thus turned to criticize Hauerwas and 
Hütter for not empowering their ecclesiologies with a sufficiently “robust” doctrine of 
God.100 Accordingly, he also finds that the emphasis on practices in recent ecclesiology 
too often assumes church practices to be self-authenticating, so that no dogmatic guidance 
is necessary.101 Rather, he argues, “Repeated performance of behavior patterns does not, 
of itself, issue in the right formation of church members nor the acquisition of Christian 
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virtues. Character is indeed formed through practices, but only as they are performed with 
appropriate intentions and construals.”102 
Barth’s virtue is that he clearly presents the relationship between proclamation 
and dogmatic theology. Following in similar Barthian tradition, John Webster has rightly 
observed that Word and Church must be held together. On the one hand, theological 
accounts of ecclesial practices too often ignore the normative contributions of the divine 
logos.103 Thus they “remain dogmatically underdeveloped, threaten to confuse ‘church’ 
and ‘sociality’, and often presuppose an Aristotelian anthropology which is not easy to 
coordinate with a Christian understanding of revelatory grace.”104 On the other hand, 
however, the incarnation must also be rooted in the practices of the church. “Much of the 
disrepair of the doctrine of the incarnation in modernity stems from the assumption that 
the doctrine can be transplanted out of its natural habitat – the practices of the Christian 
faith – and nevertheless continue to flourish.”105  The incarnation must be rooted in the 
practices of the church, yet without transplanting the whole endeavour into a moral and 
teleological vacuum. Rather, the active element from above must be emphasized; the 
graciousness of God must be prior to human action in any given ecclesial practice. In this 
respect the Barthian tradition is useful for understanding the relationship between 
practices of musical proclamation and the requisite dogmatic task. 
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As an ecclesial practice, music thus necessitates dogmatic reflection for its proper 
performance. Barth, however, cannot supply such reflection. For all the potential that his 
logocentric view of incarnation and his christological approach to ecclesiology and ethics 
offers, his strictly particularist configuration of the dialectic of veiling and unveiling—his 
material principle—prohibits any dogmatic reflection upon the music of the church. In 
CD IV.3.2, Barth does allow for discussion of music as praise, one of the core practices of 
the church, yet he fails to account for his previous prohibitions regarding music as 
proclamation.106  
It is not the logocentrism or Christocentrism of Barth’s dogmatics that are at fault 
for the lack of critical reflection on the ecclesial practice of music. Like the more recent 
essays of Nicholas Healy, the perspective taken here appreciates Barth’s situating the 
practices of the church within a strongly christological, dogmatic framework that takes its 
starting point from an analogia fidei over against natural theology. If this were not the 
case, then there would be no need to deal with Barth at all; one could simply proceed in 
the fashion of the “new ecclesiologists” and discuss the ecclesial practice of music 
without resorting to any quest for normativity.  
The problem, rather, is with the particular way in which Barth limits the scope of 
christologically-based church practices, i.e. the category of “proclamation.” If the scope 
of proclamation is widened to include the ecclesial practice of music, then the instrument 
of dogmatic critique may be utilized to ensure the adherence of such practice to the 
normativity of the Word of God. The next chapter presents the first of these movements, 
that of widening the scope of proclamation to include music; the subsequent move of 
dogmatic critique is presented in chapter four. Barth’s approach to dogmatics is extremely 
helpful; his approach to ecclesial practices, however, must be supplemented. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
POPE BENEDICT XVI  
AND THE ANCIENT ECCLESIAL PRACTICE OF MUSIC 
 
“In liturgical music, based as it is on biblical 
faith, there is, therefore, a clear dominance 
of the Word; this music is a higher form of 
proclamation.”1 
 
 
MUSIC AND THE CATHOLIC TRADITION 
From more informal chirographs to apostolic letters and dogmatic constitutions, the 
Roman Catholic tradition has successfully guided its practice of music through official 
dogmatic promulgations. But even apart from such legislative documents, the history of 
the Catholic tradition includes numerous instances of persons exercising the kind of 
critical theological reflection on musical practices that Barth proscribes. After tracing this 
tradition through its direction of early psalmodic practice, its engagement with classical 
Western philosophy, and the broad history of its legislative actions, this chapter will focus 
on the culmination of this tradition in the musico-theological reflections of Joseph 
Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI.2 As a contemporary dogmatician of music, Benedict 
works within a particular tradition of liturgical theology that takes seriously the 
proclamatory power of the ecclesial practice of music—and the necessity of that music to 
adhere to the normativity of the logos.  
 
Psalmody in the Ancient Church 
The ancient fathers sought to establish psalmody as a distinctly Christian practice, in 
contrast to the liturgical practices of the Jewish tradition, as well as that of the ancient 
                                                 
1
 Joseph Benedict, “Music and Liturgy,” The Spirit of the Liturgy, translated by John Saward (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 149. 
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(New York: Continuum, 2005), xi-xii. Bibliographic citations, however, will use “Joseph Ratzinger.” 
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Graeco-Roman world. Music comprised a major element of the pagan cultic practices, 
serving simultaneous apotropaic and epicletic functions (warding off evil spirits and 
calling down the gods respectively).3 The Pharisees, offended by the idolatrous practices 
of many Jews who participated in Greek cultic liturgies, became opposed to instrumental 
music of any type. As the Sadducees refused to excommunicate these Jews as long as 
they paid the Temple tax, upon destruction of the Temple and the Pharisees came to 
power, all instrumental music was banned.4 By the end of the first century, then, there 
was a period of musical iconoclasm among both Jews and Christians, although it lasted 
longer for the Jewish tradition.5 
 On this basis ancient liturgical scholar Eric Werner reads the illustration of Paul (a 
Pharisee) in 1 Corinthians 13.1 as a disparagement of musical instruments: “VEa.n tai/j 
glw,ssaij tw/n avnqrw,pwn lalw/ kai. tw/n avgge,lwn( avga,phn de. mh. e;cw( ge,gona calko.j 
hvcw/n h' ku,mbalon avlala,zonÅ”6 On the other hand, however, Paul holds vocal music in 
high regard. Also in 1 Corinthians, he holds praying and singing together, valuing both 
when performed “tw/| pneu,mati” and “tw/| noi<.”7 Likewise in his letter to the Ephesians, he 
distinguishes proper worship in contradistinction from the libational practice of the pagan 
cults: “kai. mh. mequ,skesqe oi;nw|( evn w-| evstin avswti,a( avlla. plhrou/sqe evn pneu,mati( 
lalou/ntej e`autoi/j ÎevnÐ yalmoi/j kai. u[mnoij kai. wv|dai/j pneumatikai/j( a;|dontej kai. 
ya,llontej th/| kardi,a| u`mw/n tw/| kuri,w|….”8 
 In opposition to the bacchanalian intoxications, the Fathers tended to articulate a 
more sober disposition toward musical practice of the psalmody. Both John Chrysostom 
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and Niceta of Remesiana emphasized singing “with the understanding” in their 
expositions of Psalm 46. Chrysostom enjoined Christians to sing the psalms “with 
understanding…so that the mind may hear the tongue.”9 It was not enough for his 
audience to “offer mere words,” but he instructed them to practice psalmody fully aware 
of “the very meaning of our discourse.”10 Niceta of Remesiana also emphasized that 
proper psalm-singing entails an awareness of the textual content of their practice, “so that 
we think of what we sing, rather than allow the mind, caught up in distractions (as often 
happens), to lose the fruit of its labor.”11 Of course, there is the oft-cited passage from 
Book X of Augustine’s Confessions, where he admits struggling with the sensual 
pleasures of singing the psalms while seeking to rationally pronounce them.12  
In this same passage, Augustine references the extremism of Athanasius, who 
“required the reader of the psalm to perform it with so little inflection of voice that it 
resembled speaking more than singing.”13 Athanasius would also emphasize the rational 
element in psalmody in his letter to Marcellinus: “to sing the Psalms demands such 
concentration of a man's whole being on them that, in doing it, his usual disharmony of 
mind and corresponding bodily confusion is resolved, just as the notes of several flutes 
are brought by harmony to one effect.”14 Thus for the fourth-century bishop of 
Alexandria, disciplining the senses and the mind through psalmodic practice served a 
moral function. “For a soul rightly ordered by chanting the sacred words forgets its own 
afflictions and contemplates with joy the things of Christ alone.”15 
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 As the early church sought to establish its own practice of psalmody, 
distinguished from Jewish and pagan liturgical practices, its understanding of this practice 
shifted with a new exegetical approach that heard the voice of Christ in and through the 
psalter itself. As Hilary of Poitiers’ psalmodic hermeneutic states: “The primary condition 
of knowledge for reading the Psalms is the ability to see as whose mouthpiece we are to 
regard the Psalmist as speaking, and who it is that he addresses.”16 In the twentieth 
century, Marie-Josèphe Rondeau proposed an approach to patristic exegesis along similar 
lines: exégèse prosopologique.17 Such an approach to the psalms “consiste à s’interroger 
sur l’identité des personnages mis en scène, en particulier sur l’identité du personnage 
qui parle.”18 Scholarship along these lines has found that the patristics often read the 
voice of Christ in the Psalms. Balthasar Fischer wrote that “die Psalmen reden der 
Frühkirche entweder von oder zu Christus, oder sie hört Christus in ihnen reden.”19 
Furthermore, the patristic psalms did not just read Christ in general terms, but either in 
conversation with the Father or listening to the voice of the church. “ 
Der Psalter ist für die Kirche der Märtyter ein Christusbuch, dessen 
Lieder um den am Kreuz erhöhten Kyrios kreisen, sei es, daβ sie von Ihm, 
sei es, daβ sie zu Ihm, sei es, daβ Er selbst in ihnen zum Vater redet, wobei 
das “zu Ihm” die tragende Mitte ist: Psalmus vox de Christo / Psalmus 
vox Ecclesiae ad Christum / Psalmus vox Christi ad Patrem.”20  
 
The voice of Christ (the head) and the voice of the church (the body) are brought together 
through the doctrine of the totus Christi in Augustine’s de doctrina Christiana, thus 
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softening the distinctions between the various voices—all are the voice of Christ.21 In 
singing the psalms, then, the ancient church sang in, to, and along with Christ. Thus even 
in the church’s earliest musical practices do we find the logos as the primary hermeneutic, 
as it comprises the juncture of Trinitarian and Christological discourse. 
 
Philosophy and the Ancient and Early Medieval Church 
In addition to early psalmodic practice, the ancient and early medieval church was 
conversant with contemporary philosophies regarding music. Through both Plato’s 
Timaeus and the Pythagoreans before him, the study of music entailed an examination of 
the order that governs the cosmos.22 Through both the a priori deductions of Euclidean 
mathematics and the somewhat flawed observational studies of sound and sky, the planets 
were believed to emit their own frequencies along a harmonious scale.23 Jamie James sees 
a relation between this musico-cosmic order and the divine logos: “Pythagoras’s [sic] 
identification of ratio, or logos, with the divine principle of universal order harmonized 
with the gospel’s identification of logos with God, of which Jesus was the 
manifestation.”24 Although the Christian logos should hardly be reduced to Pythagorean 
science, there is indeed an analogy between the two. Clement of Alexandria, 
representative par excellence of the Alexandrian school of logos-christology, took up 
music in his Exhortation to the Greeks: “Behold the might of the new song [Christ]!...It 
also composed the universe into melodious order, and tuned the discord of the elements to 
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harmonious arrangement, so that the whole world might become harmony….The violence 
of fire it has softened by the atmosphere, as the Dorian is blended with the Lydian strain; 
and the harsh cold of the air it has moderated by the embrace of fire, harmoniously 
arranging these the extreme tones of the universe.”25 Yet Clement was also keen to 
distinguish the Christian logos from that of Middle Platonism by his identification of the 
logos in historical terms, in the person of Jesus Christ.26 In his musical cosmogony, he 
made it a point to extricate “Thracian music, which is like that invented by Jubal” from 
the harmony of the universe, which was rather “according to the paternal counsel of God, 
which fired the zeal of David.”27 
The order underlying music, however, was not just observed in the natural 
sciences; early social science also incorporated the study of music into its repertoire. 
Plato’s Republic discusses how music helps to build a “harmonious” personality and 
calms the passions.28 Aristotle’s Politics addresses both the study of music as a rational, 
moral discipline of leisure and aesthetic enjoyment.29 Like Plato, Aristotle examines the 
various modes according to their psychological effects.30  
Likewise, ancient and medieval Christian writings reflect this musico-
philosophical unity between cosmic order and moral harmony. In addition to Athanasius’ 
letter to Marcellinus (recounted above), Jerome classified the psalms according to their 
purpose. Utilizing a threefold scheme—one that may be confusing by its reiteration of the 
term “psalm” to denote a subgroup within the Psalms—Jerome distinguished between 
“psalms,” “hymns” and “spiritual songs.” The former contain the moral element, 
entreating persons to discern right and wrong. Hymns, which include the Alleluia as 
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either a prefix or appendix, “declare the power and majesty of the Lord.” The latter deal 
with “the harmony of the world and the order and concord of all creatures.”31 The sixth 
book of Augustine’s de Musica examined the study of musical rhythm, in gradual ascent 
toward the most perfect delineation of number, that of justice.32 
In the Augustinian tradition, Boethius’ student Cassiodorus pursued the study of 
the pagan classics within the liberal arts, particularly those relating to music. Cassiodorus 
translated the classical musical modes into Christian terms, expanding Augustine’s study 
of rhythm into a general Christian music theory that took hold throughout the medieval 
era.33 Thomas Aquinas followed in Cassiodorus’ wake, citing Boethius and Aristotle’s 
Politics in affirming whether God should be praised with song. He writes: “it is evident 
that the human soul is moved in various ways according to various melodies of 
sound….Hence the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that the 
souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion.”34 Umberto Eco 
distinguishes between Augustine and Aquinas:  
In St. Augustine’s discussion of sacred music there was a recurrent theme, 
namely, his fear that he would concentrate on the music without reference 
to its religious function, his fear of losing himself in vain contemplation. 
Aquinas, who always has Augustine in mind and quotes from him 
repeatedly, seems unaffected by this fear and solves the problem in a 
different manner: he recognizes the psychagogic function of sacred music 
and puts the pleasure experienced in music on a different level.35 
Although Augustine and Aquinas treat the matter differently, both affirm the 
primary importance of the Word in their deliberations regarding the power of 
music.  
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The relation between Christian music theory and the ecclesial practice of music 
has been debated, however. Medieval music scholar James McKinnon makes the 
interesting observation that the philosophy of music and concrete musical practices 
comprised two separate entities in ancient Christian thought: “The medieval authors took 
it for granted that they were to apply their theory to the chant they sang every day at Mass 
and in the Office, while it never occurred to Augustine, Boethius and Cassiodorus that the 
academic discipline of music had anything to do with the psalmody they heard in 
church.”36 Augustine’s use of the Ambrosian hymn Deus Creator Omnium in de Musica 
appears to contradict this claim, however. While it may be argued that this hymn is used 
simply as an illustration of his numerical ascent toward justice, rather than as a concrete 
ecclesial practice, it is hard to imagine that Augustine and his readers would have sung 
this hymn, among others, without meditating upon the rhythm of the words during their 
performance. 
  
Legislation on the ecclesial practice of music 
In addition to theological reflection on both the philosophy of music and the ecclesial 
practice of music, the Catholic tradition has a significant history of legislating on musical 
matters. The first pope to legislate sacred music was Clement (fl. 92-101); his Epistle to 
the Corinthians forbade chanting and hymn-singing outside immediate context of the 
liturgy.37 It was not until the fourth century, however, that attention was again paid to 
sacred music. Pope Damasus (fl. 366-384) prescribed chant to be performed in the 
manner of Jerome,38 and Pope Celestin (fl. 422-432) devised the first system by which the 
psalter was to be chanted before the celebration of the mass. Monasteries devoted to the 
                                                 
36
 McKinnon, “Christian Antiquity,” 85. 
37
 PLSM, 1-2. 
38
 Ibid., 2-3. 
57 
 
development and performance of chant were instituted soon thereafter, as well as the 
annalem cantum, the organization of melodies to be chanted for each day of the year.39 
Hayburn’s history of papal legislation on sacred music presents Pope Gregory (fl. 
590-604) as the author of the Roman Rite, and holds that the popes succeeding Gregory 
for the next three centuries strictly followed his lead, establishing legislation that either 
enforced, explicated or elaborated upon Gregorian reforms. Such a view holds that 
“Gregorian” chant moved into Germany and the Frankish Empire during the eighth 
century.40 The first papal document devoted exclusively to matters of sacred music was 
Leo IV’s bull, Una Res, which officially prescribed the forms of chant to follow, as well 
as those to avoid (under threat of excommunication).41  
But it was in the twelfth century that musical developments within Gregorian 
chant emerged as serious issues. The twelfth century bishop of Chartres, John of 
Salisbury (1120-80), was appalled by the developments in Notre Dame, later christened 
as the Ars antiqua: “Bad taste has, however, degraded even religious worship, bringing 
into the presence of God, into the recesses of the sanctuary a kind of luxurious and 
lascivious singing, full of ostentation, which with female modulation astonishes and 
enervates the souls of the hearers.”42 St Aelred (1109-66), the Cistercian abbot of 
Rielvaulx Abbey in Yorkshire, complained of intervals and phrasing in chant that likened 
it to “the whinnying of a horse.”43  
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By the early fourteenth century, further developments in musical composition and 
performance practice exacerbated the situation.44 In his papal bull, Docta Sanctorum 
Patrum (1324), Pope John XXII established that no violence be done to the words of 
Gregorian chant, and that one “must sing with modesty and gravity, melodies of a calm 
and peaceful character.”45 He was principally reacting against the developments in the 
metre of plainchant. “But certain exponents of a new school, who think only of the laws 
of measured time, are composing new melodies of their own creation with a new system 
of notes, and these they prefer to the ancient, traditional music.”46 More specifically, the 
bull claimed that this use of stricter metre prevented a proper reverence in the music: 
“These musicians run without pausing, they intoxicate the ear without satisfying it, they 
dramatize the text with gestures and, instead of promoting devotion, they prevent it by 
creating a sensuous a innocent atmosphere.”47 The bull tolerated polyphony in the use of 
octaves, fourths and fifths, allowing them on the greater feasts, the Mass, and the Divine 
Office, but insisted that monophonic chant maintained priority.  
During the sixteenth century reformation, the closing sessions of the Council of 
Trent deliberated upon four musical concerns: the regulation of liturgical texts, the 
unintelligibility of sacred words, the use of secular or profane songs, and lengthy organ 
compositions.48 These concerns arose in response to the Protestant use of hymns, local 
German folk songs, and lyrics that were, like much of early Protestant rhetoric, 
significantly anti-Catholic. Other roots of these concerns include the sources of song 
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texts, poor performance practices on the part of cathedral canons, and use of chant books 
other than those prescribed by Rome.49 
 Hayburn lists the total papal legislation regarding sacred music until 1977 as four 
motu proprios, four encyclical letters, two edicts, seventeen apostolic constitutions, ten 
apostolic letters, 78 papal letters, four decrees during the Council of Trent and 265 
decrees from various congregations (primarily the Congregation of Sacred Rites). 
Hayburn concludes that the purpose of all of these documents is “to regulate the dignity 
of worship.”50 More specifically, however, it is evident in the vast majority of such 
legislation that the relation between words and music has been an ongoing struggle, but 
Church legislation has consistently placed the emphasis on the words, so that music 
should serve them and accentuate their proclamation. Hayburn writes:  
[The purpose of sacred music] is to emphasize the words of the liturgical 
text. It should give these words a dramatic force and power. It should 
impress them more deeply on the mind. It should lend them a sweetness 
and a persuasiveness that will engrave them indelibly on the heart. If the 
music in church obscures, confuses, or entangles the words which it is 
intended to illustrate and enforce, then it fails in its purpose.51 
 
Moving to more contemporary legislation on sacred music, Hayburn considers 
Pius X’s Tra Le Sollecitudini (1903) to be the fortissimo in the history of papal legislation 
on sacred music.52 His terminology is appropriate, as this document has informed all 
Catholic reflection on sacred music since its promulgation. Pius X, previously Giuseppe 
Sarto, was actively involved in the regulation and teaching of sacred music before his 
election as pope in August 1903. As Bishop of Mantua, he convened the Synod of 
Mantua in 1888, the decrees of which included specific legislation regarding music. Five 
years later, as Cardinal and Patriarch of Venice, he issued both a votum and a pastoral 
                                                 
49
 Ibid., 25-26. The bulk of Hayburn’s historical account concerns the various editions of chant books 
(Medicean, Ratisbon, Solesmes and Vatican editions). 
50
 Ibid., 387.  
51
 Ibid., 388. 
52
 Ibid., xi. 
60 
 
letter on sacred music. Just three months after his election as pope, the third section of his 
earlier votum would be issued as TLS, with only minor revisions.53 
TLS outlines how art, specifically sacred music, should be used in the service of 
the liturgy. The primary qualities of sacred music are defined as holiness, dignity, beauty 
and universality. Sacred music, TLS affirms, is to be directed to the general object of the 
liturgy, which is the “glory of God and the sanctification and edification of the faithful.”54 
Most significantly for this dissertation is the “chief duty” of sacred music: “to clothe the 
liturgical text.”55 Gregorian chant, “so happily restored to its original perfection and 
purity by recent study,” is held as the “highest model” of sacred music. In this respect, 
TLS claims, “the more a musical composition…is like Gregorian chant in its movement, 
its inspiration, and its feeling, so much the more is it right and liturgical, and the more it 
differs from this highest model so much the less is it worthy of the house of God.”56 Other 
types of music are discussed (classical polyphony, modern music, Italian opera), but 
primacy is given to Gregorian chant, guided by the simple purpose of sacred music to 
serve the text. A minimalist aesthetic is promulgated, as the monophony of chant is 
assumed to allow the text a greater presence, unimpeded by musical embroidery or 
distracting cultural associations (such as theatre music).57 
Latin is defined in TLS as “the language of the Roman Church,” and the use of 
vernacular languages is prohibited in sacred music. Furthermore, the text, as fixed to the 
liturgical calendar, cannot be changed for different occasions. The text must be sung 
according to the authentic books promulgated by the church. No “needless repetition” is 
allowed, although no specifics are given to distinguish between what is “needless” and 
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what is necessary. Nor are division of syllables to be allowed, in order to prevent 
excessive embellishment on an otherwise minimalist musical aesthetic.58 
 Use of the organ is allowed, but any other instrument requires the permission of a 
bishop. The piano-forte, along with drums, cymbals and triangles, are expressly 
forbidden. Instruments must “sustain” the voices, not “crush” them. There should be no 
instrumental prelude to the voices, nor interruption of those voices; vocal accompaniment 
is the only use of any musical instrument. Bands are forbidden from performing in the 
liturgy, but they are allowed outside the church (at festivals, for instance). In all 
performance and planning of liturgical music, then, music is to be the “humble attendant” 
to the liturgy; never should it be primary.59 
 Promulgated in 1903, the first year of Pius X’s pontificate, TLS would set the tone 
of all twentieth century Catholic documents on music. On Christmas Day of 1955, Pius 
XII issued his encyclical letter, Musicae sacrae discipina.60 The purpose of sacred music 
is explained as consisting in the fact  
that its lovely melodies and splendor beautify and embellish the voices of 
the priest who offers Mass and of the Christian people who praise the 
Sovereign God. Its special power and excellence should lift up to God the 
minds of the faithful who are present. It should make the liturgical prayers 
of the Christian community more alive and fervent so that everyone can 
praise and beseech the Triune God more powerfully, more intently and 
more effectively.61 
 
This document would relax the prohibitions in TLS, but as an encyclical letter it has 
served more as a commentary on TLS than as separate legislation.62 Other twentieth 
century documents on sacred music would follow a similar path, examining the same 
issues and treating them in similar ways.  
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However, a slow development also took place, leading to post-conciliar liturgical 
reform. In 1958 the Sacred Congregation of Rites put forward an Instruction on Music 
and Liturgy, the most significant contribution of which was a categorization of types of 
liturgical participation: internal, external and sacramental.63 Five years later, at the 
beginning of the Second Vatican Council, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Liturgy, 
Sacrosanctum Concilium, devoted an entire chapter to the practice of sacred music.64 This 
constitution would examine the notion of “active participation,” prompting liturgies in the 
vernacular rather than Latin.65 Significantly, SC would also claim that “Genuine worship 
music is not simply an auxiliary prop to the liturgical action, but the very means by which 
certain liturgical acts occur….”66 Four years later the Congregation for Divine Worship 
would put forward Musicam Sacram in order to examine the impact of SC for liturgical 
music. This document broke significant ground in that it attended to the particularity of 
the performers of sacred music. The style of music should be guided by the abilities of the 
performers, it encouraged a variety of styles, and claimed that the solemnity of liturgical 
music depends on the reverence of the performers, rather than on the style of music 
performed.67 In addition, MS would allow instruments to provide solos in addition to 
vocal accompaniment (except at solemn occasions such as Advent, Lent, the Easter 
Triduum and the funeral mass).68 These radical changes to the liturgy in the latter half of 
the twentieth century provide the context for Benedict’s writings regarding liturgy and 
sacred music. 
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Benedict XVI and the Catholic Tradition 
This history demonstrates several things about Benedict’s approach to the ecclesial 
practice of music. First, Benedict does not inherit the same Reformed reservations about 
music and other ecclesial practices as Barth. Lacking Barth’s fearful reticence towards the 
divine Word, Benedict bravely embraces the ministry of the divine Word in a multiplicity 
of forms. In particular, music is a significant revelatory form. Music performed by the 
church, as the church, is not just a human activity occupied solely with itself, but God’s 
activity in and through the church for the world. What this means for the ecclesial 
practice of music is that an ethic of music is not just a possibility, but both a fact and a 
necessity. Whereas Barth would rather abstain from applying dogmatic scrutiny to music 
(however much he might enjoy it as a listener), Benedict affirms such work earnestly.69 
Secondly, Benedict must attend to the manner of the relationship between music 
and the divine Word. For him, the music of the church dares to proclaim the very Word of 
God. It is for this reason that he articulates controversial statements such as: “Not every 
kind of music can have a place in Christian worship. It has its standards, and that standard 
is the Logos,”70 and “because of its very nature [rock] music…must be excluded from the 
Church.”71  
Thirdly, Benedict emerges from a tradition that takes stylistic considerations 
seriously. Indeed Benedict comes down hard on rock and pop music (his distinction 
between them fitting into his taxonomy of music in general). The problem of genre and 
performance style in the ecclesial practice of music must be suspended, however, until 
after the primary theological issues are addressed. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
demonstrate that Benedict offers a particularly dogmatic way of reflecting upon the 
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ecclesial practice of music. Like Barth, he does this by locating music within a robustly 
logocentric doctrine of the Word, as well as a fundamentally theocentric ecclesiology.  
 
“THEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF CHURCH MUSIC”: AN EARLIER ESSAY 
While consistent with his later writings on music, an earlier essay of Benedict’s on the 
“Theological Problems of Church Music”72 provides a good demonstration of his 
adherence to the historical tradition of Catholic reflection on music. In particular, this 
essay is representative of the ressourcement movement, which—over against Catholic 
modernism—sought to ground contemporary Catholic theology in the broader historical 
tradition of the church.73 Faced with an iconoclastic challenge in the church, Benedict 
will defend the Catholic heritage that takes sacred music seriously, as it participates in the 
incarnation of the Word of God. In later essays he will spell out this relation between 
music and the Word more explicitly, but for the moment it is important to see how this 
early essay demonstrates Benedict’s willingness to be conversant with the ancient sources 
of his tradition. 
 Benedict opens this essay by describing the “properly ecclesiastical and 
theological crisis of church music,” which has fallen between two “widely differing 
theological millstones.” These millstones, he asserts, “agree only in grinding musica 
sacra down to dust.”74 The first of these “theological millstones” is described as the 
“puritanic functionalism of a liturgy conceived in purely pragmatic terms,” by which he 
means an iconoclasm that dismisses efforts toward artistic “splendour” in favor of more 
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“pragmatic” projects, such as building a sense of community within a local 
congregation.75 The second millstone that threatens the music of the church is the 
“functionalism of accommodation,” in which the distinctive culture of the church has 
been set aside in favor of appealing towards more contemporary or secular artistic 
forms.76 Between puritan iconoclasm and cultural accommodation, then, sacred music 
finds its integrity endangered. 
 Regarding the first threat, a “Christian” iconoclasm that insists upon the rejection 
of artistic embellishment upon the Word of God, Benedict asks whether it is not 
iconoclasm that is un-Christian, “so that art and precisely church music would actually be 
an inner requirement of what is Christian, and thus, along with church music, music in 
general could constantly draw new hope from this fact?”77 To argue this point, Benedict 
reviews the writings of the patristics in order to argue for an original anti-iconoclasm. 
Contemporary iconoclasts, he states, presuppose an original iconoclasm in the early 
Church. According to such a view, Christian worship must make a definitive break with 
the Temple, and move toward a less ornate and more “commonplace” worship. Benedict 
admits that there must be a significant shift in worship between the world of the Old 
Testament and that of the New, but argues that this shift must not be understood as a 
desacralizing or a preference for the “commonplace.” Rather, the New Testament 
assumes a rich liturgical life in which psalms, hymns and spiritual songs are performed.78  
This much is clear: from the very beginning, Christian worship was the 
worship of God and clearly contrasted with the everyday and the 
commonplace. Indeed, from the very beginning it was characterised by 
earnest efforts toward a new form of poetic and musical praise, and this 
from theological motives.79  
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The shift from the Old to the New is understood by Benedict as “the transition from 
crying to singing.”80 Such a depiction of the biblical witness in real and emotional human 
terms demonstrates the corporeality with which Benedict is to understand music. As the 
Church “can and must lay claim to the inheritance of the Temple,” a Christian liturgy will 
regard “the whole cosmos as its temple, must have a cosmic character, must make the 
whole cosmos resound.”81 Thus he answers the iconoclasts by affirming that “church 
music with artistic pretensions is not opposed to the essence of Christian liturgy, but is 
rather a necessary way of expressing belief in the world-filling glory of Jesus Christ.”82 It 
is not that the church may be artistic, but rather that the church must express its faith in 
artistic terms. Benedict considers art not merely permitted, but mandated.  
The Church’s liturgy has a compelling mandate to reveal in resonant sound 
the glorification of God which lies hidden in the cosmos. This, then, is the 
liturgy’s essence: to transpose the cosmos, to spiritualise it into the gesture 
of praise through song and thus to redeem it; to “humanise” the world.83 
 
Benedict concludes this essay with a brief look at “the question of sacredness.” It 
is here that the crux of his spiritualised understanding of music becomes clear. He states 
that the distinction between sacred and secular music “was very much present in the 
Church of the early Fathers, but was almost completely buried under a mass of other 
problems.”84 This distinction, according to Benedict, finally became apparent with the 
developments of polyphonic organum (the Ars Antiqua and Ars Nova). Accounting for 
Pope John XXII’s Docta Sanctorum Patrum as a struggle between the same two 
“theological millstones,” Benedict identifies a puritanical bias against new developments 
in music on the one hand and the Church’s accommodation to secular culture on the 
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other. Pope John’s admittance of polyphony “on condition that the melodies themselves 
remain intact in the pure integrity of their form” was, according to Benedict’s reading, a 
synthesis that answers the two dialectically opposed “millstones,” while establishing the 
primary value of church music as its service toward the Word. “In other words 
relationship to the text, predominance of the melody and reference to the formal 
structures of the chant as the point of departure for ecclesiastical polyphony as against a 
concept of structure which destroys the text, as against the emphasis upon sensual sound 
effects.”85 This is the “logocentrism” of sacred music: that music—regardless of its style 
should serve the Word, rather than the Church accommodating to (or completely denying) 
culture:  
the liturgy demands an artistic transposition out of the spirit of the faith, an 
artistic transposition of the music of the cosmos into human music which 
glorifies the Word made flesh. Such music must obey a stricter law than 
the commonplace music of everyday life: such music is beholden to the 
Word and must lead to the Spirit.”86 
 
The struggle between Gregorian chant and the French ars nova resolves itself in 
relationship to the Word. Benedict ignores the matter of measured music that was, along 
with polyphony, the musical element at issue in the Docta Sanctorum Patrum. Proper 
historical attention to measured music, however, would strengthen Benedict’s argument 
rather than weaken it. Both polyphony and measured music were judged by Pope John 
XXII on the basis of their service toward the Word.87 
 Thus, in contrast to iconoclastic arguments (such as Barth’s), Benedict argues that 
music is a necessary part of the church’s commission: “in the face of puritanical pride 
[the Church] must justify the necessary incarnation of the spirit in music, and vis-à-vis the 
commonplace she must seek to point the spirit and the cosmos in the direction of the 
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Divine.”88 Here in this early essay, it is evident that Benedict is eager to defend Catholic 
tradition against the kind of iconoclasm seen in Barth. Yet he does this without discarding 
the centrality of the Word; it is music’s close relation to the Word that drives Benedict to 
treat it with such care and reverence. Benedict is able to do such theological work by 
adhering more closely to the ancient traditions of the church’s theological reflections on 
music. 
 
SACRED MUSIC IN THE MINISTRY OF THE WORD  
Now that Benedict’s relation to a more ancient theological tradition has been established, 
the contours of his use of that tradition may be traced more fully. In short, Benedict’s 
understanding of revelation leads him to affirm the ecclesial practice of music as a 
necessary part of the church’s ministry of the Word. 
 
The primacy of the logos 
For Benedict, treating music dogmatically is natural, given his position on music’s 
participation in the proclamation of the divine Word. Benedict considers music to be a 
valid, albeit non-textual, form of divine revelation. Such a claim is not significant in 
itself, however, for truly divine revelation may occur by whatever means God chooses. 
Barth readily acknowledged this in his oft-quoted statement regarding communism and 
dead dogs. But whereas Barth insisted that the church is not commissioned to pass on 
what it hears through these things, Benedict disagrees. Both Barth and Benedict maintain 
that the acts of worship are intrinsic to the constitution of the church, meaning that the 
church is what the church does. But Benedict would include the entirety of the church’s 
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practices, rather than simply a few privileged “commissions.” Among these broader 
practices stands music. Before examining the particular practice of music among these 
broader practices, however, it is first necessary to inquire into Benedict’s understanding 
of the divine liturgy and its relationship to the divine Word. Fundamental to Pope 
Benedict’s understanding of music’s role within divine revelation is his insistence that 
revelation, in and through the divine liturgy, is an act of God. 
Benedict emphasizes in his Introduction to Christianity that the fundamental claim 
of the Christian faith is “the primacy of the logos as against mere matter.”89 This means 
that the divine communication that ordered the world is real and alive and infiltrates the 
created world. Revelation of this logos within creation enlivens and redeems the material 
world. 
For Benedict, as for Barth, divine revelation is an act. Whatever the Word is in 
itself, its manifestation in human affairs comes as an event: “…in the cross and 
resurrection, the Incarnation of the Word becomes the ‘verbification’ of the flesh. Each 
penetrates the other….The flesh itself is ‘logicized’.”90 This does not mean that in Christ 
the human body becomes a mathematical equation or positivistic doctrine. Rather, 
Benedict indicates here the relationship between flesh and the divine logos, the 
communication of God that manifests itself as a human person.91  
Thus, for Benedict, as the Word becomes flesh, that flesh is incorporated into the 
activity of that Word. The “‘verbification’ of the flesh” describes the activity, or 
practices, of a humanity joined with God in Christ. For this reason, Benedict is more 
ready to explore the extra-textual possibilities of the divine Word. It is a Word, to be sure, 
but not one that is limited to words. 
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The act of worship itself is the locus of divine revelation for Benedict. In 
discussing the liturgy, he takes the Pauline logikh.n latrei,a of Romans 12.1, translating it 
as “divine worship moulded by the Word.” He then explains that “’Word’ in the biblical 
(and also in the Greek) sense is more than language or speech, namely creative 
reality.…’Word’ in the biblical sense is more than ‘text’.”92 Relying on the Johannine 
prologue and farewell discourse, Benedict extends this relation even further.93 The Word 
does not just “mould” worship, but it is in worship that the divine Word is made flesh. In 
worship the “living reality” that is the Word is spoken and given bodily form by “a God 
who is self-communicating meaning and who communicates himself by becoming 
man.”94 
In terms of the concrete practices that constitute worship, then, these activities are 
rooted in a divine, rather than human, initiative. “[I]t is not the case that you think 
something up and then sing it; instead, the song comes to you from the angels, and you 
have to lift up your heart so that it may be in tune with the music coming to it.”95 For 
Benedict the liturgy is an act of God, in which human practices are taken up and 
incorporated into the divine act of revelation. “Earthly liturgy is liturgy because and only 
because it joins what is already in process, the greater reality.”96 
It is on this basis that Benedict attends to the post-conciliar reform of the liturgy. 
His primary difficulty with such reform is what he calls the “sociological reduction” of 
the liturgy.97 The shift that occurred between pre- and postconciliar liturgical practice is 
not, he insists, from the priest to the congregation as the liturgical subject. This popular 
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misconception of liturgical reform constitutes a serious concern for Benedict. “The 
priest…never had the right to determine by himself what was to be done in the liturgy. 
Liturgy was completely nonarbitrary for him. It preceded him as ‘rite’, that is, as an 
objective form of the corporate prayer of the Church.”98 Citing the Catechism for 
authority, he defines the liturgy as “service in the name of/on behalf of the people,” 
further emphasizing that such practices do not emerge from any human initiative, but 
rather are divine acts incarnated within human practice.99 
It cannot be overemphasized that such a view of human practices emerges out of a 
distinctively christological approach to theology and ethics. Christology shapes much, if 
not all, of Benedict’s writings in what is often termed “practical theology,” particularly 
his approach to the liturgy. “The decisive factor, therefore, is the primacy of Christology. 
Liturgy is God’s work or it does not exist at all.”100 As the priest himself is not the subject 
of the liturgy, he is the vehicle through which the person of Christ continues the ministry 
of the Word of God. “In the liturgy the priest says and does what he cannot do and say on 
his own; he acts…in persona Christi….”101 Such a divine encounter occurs in each 
concrete practice of the liturgy, from preaching to sacrament, from kneeling to singing: 
“every liturgical action…is an encounter between Christ and the Church.”102  
 
Divine action and ecclesiology 
From the assertion that God-in-Christ acts in and through liturgical practices follows an 
equally robust, yet fundamental, claim about ecclesiology: that God acts in and through 
the church. Throughout his career, ecclesiology has been one of the primary topics of 
Catholic theology. Whereas the First Vatican Council in the previous century “had simply 
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left a fragment of ecclesiology,” ‘the Church’ became perhaps the primary contribution of 
the Second Vatican Council.103 Benedict suggests that the ecclesiological focus of the 
council was in part due to Barth’s influence among the German bishops.104 Whatever 
ecclesiological road the council took, however, there were forces in place to ensure that 
the question of God was taken seriously. Benedict recounts one elder German bishop 
exclaiming in a preliminary meeting: “My dear Brothers, at the Council you must above 
all talk about God. That is what is most important.”105 He uses this anecdote to introduce 
the importance of prohibiting the tendency of ecclesiology to ignore its properly 
theological aspect.106 Too often, he argues, ecclesiology succumbs to the temptation to 
conceive of the church along sociological lines of argument.  
In elucidating the German word Gemeinde (assembly, gathering), Benedict states 
that it is difficult to translate this term into other languages as it has two distinct senses: 
that those brought together are joined together “through the liturgical event into a 
concrete representation of the People of God” and the People of God are “by virtue of the 
Lord active co-celebrants of the liturgical event.”107 Of course, Benedict’s discussion of 
co-celebration sounds strikingly similar to Barth’s use of the Auftrag, in which the church 
both receives and shares its commission to preach and administer the sacraments. 
Benedict is equally cautious, however, that the scales of such co-celebration might be 
tipped in favor of the community and taking away from God. He writes:  
“But we must resolutely defend ourselves against the hypostatization of 
the community, which is common today. As the Catechism rightly states, 
the assembled derive their unity from the communion of the Holy Spirit; 
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they are not such on their own, as a sociologically self-contained 
quantity.”108 
 
Furthermore, Benedict insists that the community is much greater than a group of shared 
sociological similarities. It is the Spirit of God that brings together the “People of God,” 
which he states “comes into being again and again only through the service of the Son 
and by his lifting us into the community of God which we cannot enter on our own.”109 
This notion of the “People of God” strikes at the heart of Benedict’s robust, yet 
fundamental, ecclesiology: the Church consists of people, to be sure, but people who 
belong to God.  
For Benedict, questions of ecclesiology, liturgy, and music are intertwined. In the 
liturgical reform after Vatican II, the question of what constitutes proper liturgical music 
became for him fundamental to liturgical theology. “It has become a question of the 
essence of liturgical action as such, of its anthropological and theological foundations. 
The controversy about Church music is becoming symptomatic for the deeper question 
about what the liturgy is.”110 Because of this fundamental importance, he finds the battles 
over liturgical music to be a crucial aspect of ecclesiology as a whole. In his writings, 
liturgical music often serves as both an example of an ecclesial practice—which, upon 
further investigation, opens up broader issues of ecclesiology—and as the particular 
object of his dogmatic scrutiny.  
Benedict argues against those in the post-conciliar liturgical renewal movement 
who would conceive of their work in terms of group-sociology rather than a properly 
theological ecclesiology. In particular, he takes issue with the approach taken to liturgical 
music in the Nouvo Dizionario di Liturgia. Published in 1984, this dictionary is 
representative of the liturgical reform that took place in the wake of Sacrosanctum 
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Concilium. The essay on singing and music, “Canto e musica,” caught Benedict’s 
watchful eye and thus his criticism. He argues that “a basically new understanding of 
liturgy” is taking hold, surpassing the council rather than remaining within its spirit.111  
He aims his criticism as their use (or misuse) of Matthew 18:20, “For where there 
are two or three gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.”112 
Benedict finds that such a definition of the church is much too thin for a properly 
theological ecclesiology. Although Benedict does not fault progressive liturgists for the 
widespread removal of the passage from its larger scriptural context (that of community 
judgment and forgiveness), he criticizes instead the isolation of the text from “the whole 
liturgical tradition,” thereby setting up a more sociological—and less theological—
conception of the church.113 “For the two or three are now placed in opposition to an 
institution with its institutional roles, and to every ‘codified program’. Thus this definition 
comes to mean: it is not the Church that precedes the group but the group that precedes 
the Church.”114  
Benedict particularly takes offense to the notion that the hierarchy of the Church 
and church tradition may be summarily dismissed as antiquarian and authoritarian. “A 
certain administration of power, we are told, feels threatened by process of cultural 
transformation and reacts by masking its striving for self-preservation as love for the 
tradition.”115 Benedict does not have much patience for those who are suspicious of a 
hierarchical church, and is eager to dismantle their position. In an interview he has 
characterized this more progressive approach thusly:  
People think they know the Church. They think she is a very ancient 
system that has become sclerotic over time, that gets progressively more 
insulated and rigid, that forms a sort of armor that smothers one’s personal 
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life. That is the impression of many people. Few people manage to 
recognize instead that there is something fresh and also bold and large-
minded here, something that offers escape from the stale habits of one’s 
life.116  
 
Benedict also takes great offense at the notion that the “institutional” nature of the 
church would contribute to such “stale habits.” As an institution, the church “bears a 
negative quality in the type of sociology adopted here [in “Canto e musica”]. It embodies 
power, and power is considered an antithesis to freedom.”117 Accordingly, he accuses 
these progressive liturgists of finding the historical liturgy “more a question of cultic 
bureaucracy than of the singing activity of the people.”118 They wish to discard tradition, 
he claims, so that it “is not obedience to the whole but the creativity of the moment that 
becomes the determining form.”119 In his attack of this “new conception” of the liturgy, 
Benedict finds error with two specific values: authenticity and identification.  
The first error is in how the “new conception” defines authentic music.120 A 
loosely defined “freedom” is held by the progressive liturgists to be an essential principle 
of authenticity, that is, an authentically created music would be one in which its 
participants act freely and without constraint.121 But the church is not like that, he argues. 
“One who truly acts in the liturgy also disappears with the collective subject ‘Church’. 
For it is forgotten that the liturgy is to be the opus Dei in which God himself acts first and 
we are redeemed precisely through the fact that he acts.”122 Benedict relies heavily here 
on the liturgical-theological work of Romano Guardini, who stressed a more ontological 
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than ethical approach. The liturgy, Guardini held, is the inner trinitarian dialogue moving 
outwards, “God’s action in and among us.”123 Benedict states that Guardini “stressed 
emphatically that in the liturgy it is not a question of doing something but of being 
something. The idea that general activity is the most central value of the liturgy is the 
most radical antithesis imaginable to Guardini’s conception of the liturgy.”124 Benedict 
does several things here. First, he reinforces the tendency of ecclesiology toward being 
properly theological. Secondly, by doing so (being theological rather than sociological), 
he affirms liturgical music as participating in the divinely spoken Word. Thirdly, he thus 
legitimates the task of investigating music dogmatically.  
Benedict then takes Guardini’s three “ontological dimensions” of the liturgy—
cosmos, history and mystery—to hold the “new conception” accountable. “For the group 
liturgy is not cosmic, it lives from the autonomy of the group. It has no history, it is 
precisely that emancipation from history and doing things oneself that are characteristic 
for it….Moreover, it is ignorant of mystery, because in it everything is and must be 
explained.”125 Thus for Benedict, an authentically performed music has nothing to do 
with being “free” of institutional or traditional restraints. Rather, an authentic music 
emerges from the cosmic, historical and mysterious dimensions of the Word made flesh.  
The second error of the “new conception” of liturgy is in its emphasis on 
identification. The practice of music, according to this conception, should reflect the 
sociologically-informed identity of the “two or three gathered,” rather than a 
theologically-informed identity of the church qua church. Thus the church’s 
“unity…threatens to disappear through the derivation of the liturgy from the group 
instead of from the Church.”126 In this respect, the “new conception” is an extension of 
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the ethnomusicological investigations into music as a social practice that constructs 
identity.127 For Benedict, however, the liturgical activity of the church must be seen as 
opus Dei, a work of God. Such divine work ontologically and temporally precedes any 
human works, so that it is not the identity of a group that is constructed, but rather the 
identity of God that is imparted or made known through the music of the church.128 
 
The liturgical supplement 
The fundamental claim that divine liturgy is from God is, of course, strikingly similar to 
the Barthian position on proclamation—that this is God’s act. Benedict would even agree 
that preaching and the administration of the sacraments are distinguished among ecclesial 
practices as divinely commissioned forms of revelation, as this is affirmed in the Second 
Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation.129 But this does not 
obviate their need for some sort of liturgical supplement. The context or medium of 
preaching and the sacraments, while not primary in the same manner as their content, is 
nonetheless necessary. “[T]he Word cannot be mere talk. The sacramental signs are 
certainly the central way in which the Incarnation continues to work. But they become 
homeless if they are not immersed in a liturgy that as a whole follows this expansion of 
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the Word into the realm of the bodily and all our senses.”130 This “homelessness” of the 
fundamental elements of worship stands in marked contrast to the almost puritanical 
liturgical thinking of Barth.131 It is not the case that Benedict considers sermon and 
sacrament insufficient. Rather, the proper practice the ministry of the Word of God, 
which consists of sermon and sacrament, includes the larger liturgy, in all its various 
appurtenances. 
In an essay entitled, “Sing Artistically for God,” Benedict exegetes Psalm 47:7b 
(“sing praises with a psalm”), which in turn leads him to propose three “biblical 
directives” for church music.  The first is that musical expression in the liturgy is 
mandatory. Unlike Barth, Benedict finds an imperative towards musical proclamation: 
“musical expression is part of the proper human response to God’s self-revelation.”132 
Expressing the Word through song is for Benedict an integral part of the incarnation into 
humanity; to be human is to sing, thus the Word must be sung. “Mere speech, mere 
silence, mere action are not enough. That integral way of humanly expressing joy or 
sorrow, consent or complaint which occurs in singing is necessary for responding to 
God….”133 Furthermore, Benedict includes instrumental music with such musical 
proclamation.134 
The second biblical directive that Benedict proposes is that while the church must 
sing, it must also, as the Psalmist proclaims, “sing unto the Lord a new song.”135 Two 
assertions are important within this directive. First, Benedict uses the term “culture” to 
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describe the extra-linguistic form in which the Word is proclaimed. This culture cannot be 
excised from proclamation in such a way as Barth would like: 
There is no such thing as a faith completely undetermined by 
culture…which would then let itself be inculturated any way one likes. 
The faith decision as such entails a cultural decision; it forms the people, 
and by doing this it excludes a good many other cultural patterns as 
deformations. Faith itself creates culture and does not just carry it along 
like a piece of clothing added from the outside.136 
 
While culture is secondary to faith, it is necessary to faith. From this assertion follows a 
further description of culture that then leads to Benedict’s directive to “sing a new song”: 
“The level of a culture is discernible by its ability to assimilate, to come into contact and 
exchange, and to do this synchronically and diachronically.” Benedict thus does not see 
the culture of faith as a static, universal enterprise. It must change and adapt to local 
circumstances. “This ability to exchange and flourish…finds its expression in the ever-
recurring imperative: ‘Sing the Lord a new song.’ Experiences of salvation are found not 
only in the past, but occur over and over again; hence they also require the ever-new 
proclamation of God’s contemporaneity….”137 
Benedict’s third directive regards the quality of the music that is to be offered to 
God. Musical expression is mandatory, and it should be offered always and everywhere 
and in new and fresh ways that engage the world in which the Word is made incarnate. 
But the one offering such music back to God must also perform in an appropriate manner. 
Attention to Benedict’s dogmatic scrutiny of music appears below, but at this point it is 
important to emphasize what Benedict calls “music in accordance with logos”:  
There is an art form corresponding to God, who…is the creative Word 
which also gives meaning. This art form stands under the primacy of 
logos; that is, it integrates the diversity of the human being from the 
perspective of this being’s highest moral and spiritual powers, but in this 
way it also leads the spirit out of rationalistic and voluntaristic 
confinement into the symphony of creation.138  
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Here Benedict briefly constructs a Christian art theory, based upon YHWH’s 
instructions in Exodus regarding the construction of the tabernacle.139 He proposes three 
elements to this art theory. First, the artists themselves do not conceive or fabricate that 
which is worthy of God, or “beautiful.”140 That is the purview of God alone. From this 
follows the second element, which is that the artists are persons “to whom the Lord has 
given understanding and skill so that they can carry out what God has instructed them to 
do.”141 The final element, and perhaps the most revealing, is that such instruction or 
inspiration finds its manifestation in the “stirring of hearts.”142 Artists must be moved 
within their hearts, by which Benedict means that whatever art or culture is indeed of the 
type that comes from faith (and for faith) as the proclamation of the divine Word will 
have a much greater impact than mere cognitive awareness. Inspiration is a truly moving 
event, one which strikes at the core of the persons involved. 
  
Music and Incarnation 
One of these necessary and cultural-artistic appurtenances to the incarnation is the 
church’s music. For Benedict, liturgy and music are virtually the same entity: “one cannot 
speak of liturgy without also talking about the music of worship.”143 For it is music that 
brings expressive, rhetorical power to words, expanding what might be merely said into a 
Word to be proclaimed. “Wherever man praises God, the word alone does not suffice. 
Conversation with God transcends the boundaries of human speech, and in all places, it 
has by its very nature called music to its aid, singing and the voices of creation in the 
harmony of instruments.”144 Benedict states elsewhere that the power of God’s Word is so 
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strong that it leads one into silence—a silence that cannot comprehend its subject, but in 
this silence leads to song:  
“Faith comes from listening to God’s word. But wherever God’s word is 
translated into human words there remains a surplus of the unspoken and 
unspeakable which calls us into silence—into a silence that in the end lets 
the unspeakable becomes song and also calls on the voices of the cosmos 
for help so that the unspoken may become audible.”145 
 
As the Word’s accompaniment to its actualization in sermon and sacrament, 
liturgical music for Benedict is itself an integral part of the incarnation. “Liturgical music 
results from the claim and the dynamics of the Incarnation of the Word.”146 For Benedict, 
the incarnation begets liturgical music. Such music is not simply an optional addendum to 
the church’s ministry; rather it is the very actualization of the Word of God in the 
Christian life. He labels this musical actualization as musification: “The ‘musification’ of 
faith is a part of the process of the Incarnation of the Word.”147 By entering into the 
world, the revealed Word takes the world unto itself, redeeming those worldly elements 
and attributes that it has taken on. Corporeality and spirituality intermingle in this divine 
hypostatic act.  
On the one hand, the musification of the Word is sensualization, 
Incarnation, attraction of pre-rational forces, attraction of the hidden 
sounds of creation, discovery of the song that lies at the bottom of things. 
But…it is not only Incarnation of the Word, but at the same time 
‘spiritualization’ of the flesh.…A corporealization takes place which is 
spiritualization, and a spiritualization which is a corporealization. The 
Christian corporealization is always a spiritualization at the same time, and 
the Christian spiritualization is a corporealization into the body of the 
incarnate Logos.148  
 
Benedict’s understanding of music, then, is firmly rooted within a doctrine of the 
incarnation. Moreover, the kind of logos-christology presented here is not ignorant or 
dismissive of the pneumatological. The Holy Spirit is equally co-efficient in and with the 
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divine Word, spiritualizing the flesh as it receives the Word. In an essay from The Spirit 
of the Liturgy, Benedict portrays the Holy Spirit as a kind of “singer-songwriter”: 
The singing of the Church comes ultimately out of love. It is the utter 
depth of love that produces the singing. ‘Cantare amantis est’, says St. 
Augustine, singing is a lover’s thing. In so saying, we come again to the 
trinitarian interpretation of Church music. The Holy Spirit is love, and it is 
he who produces the singing. He is the Spirit of Christ, the Spirit who 
draws us into love for Christ and so leads to the Father.149  
 
While the church may perform music in the liturgy, it is God who originates the musical 
Word, in and through the Spirit of Christ.150 Just as the Word of God is a redemptive 
word, music may participate in this salvific ministry of the Word: “Music uncovers the 
buried way to the heart, to the core of our being, where it touches the being of the Creator 
and the Redeemer. Wherever this is achieved, music becomes the road that leads to Jesus, 
the way on which God shows his salvation.”151 
 Whereas Barth refuses to include the ecclesial practice of music within the scope 
of proclamation, Benedict embraces such musical proclamation. For him music is a 
cultural form that God may use and transform in such a way as to communicate the divine 
word into human practice and understanding. Much of the difference between Barth and 
Benedict on this point may be attributed to the latter’s adherence to a more ancient 
ecclesial tradition. Benedict does not dismiss the ancient and medieval church because of 
some “satanic” commitment to the analogia entis. Like Barth, the Fathers were wary of 
importing culture wholesale into the Christian witness. In their theological reflections on 
the nature and practice of music, however, they were able to—albeit cautiously—treat 
music as a valid participant in the proclamation of the Word of God. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DOGMATIC REFLECTION UPON MUSIC 
IN THE THOUGHT OF POPE BENEDICT XVI 
 
“The cosmic character of liturgical music 
stands in opposition to the two tendencies of 
the modern age…: music as pure 
subjectivity, music as the expression of mere 
will. We sing with the angels. But this 
cosmic character is grounded ultimately in 
the ordering of all Christian worship to 
logos”1 
 
To fail to reflect upon the church’s music would be to ignore the very commission of 
Christ: to proclaim the Word of God. Many other practices of the church are also 
involved, to be sure, such as hospitality and education.2 But if music also participates in 
such proclamation, then it must not be ignored by dogmatic theology. By setting music 
within the manifold redemptive work of the Word of God, Pope Benedict is able to 
provide critical theological reflection on music as an ecclesial practice. “The medium of 
communication and the communicated message must stand in a meaningful relationship 
to each other.”3 The Word and its proclamation should be intimately bound. Such an 
imperative requires specific critically reflective measures to ensure its actualization. Quite 
simply, the ecclesial practice of music requires dogmatic scrutiny to ensure its harmony 
with the divine logos.  
 Benedict is keenly aware of this and, as has already been shown to some extent, 
he actively proposes principles and directives to ensure that the church’s music is in 
accordance with the Word of God. While reluctant to exclude musical instruments from 
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any discussion of musical proclamation, Benedict affirms that “We must surely admit that 
the liturgy of the incarnate Word is necessarily and specifically word-oriented.”4 In this 
way, as music is “word-oriented” he carefully avoids a text-music duality in which one 
must be ascribed primacy over the other. Instead, one sees in Benedict that music is a 
kind of “culture” in which the Word of God provides guidance, its content, and its 
purpose. “If music is to be the medium of worship, it needs purifying; only then can it in 
turn have a purifying and ‘elevating’ effect.”5 The dogmatic task is necessary for the 
ecclesial practice of music, as music, for Benedict, has the ability—the mission—to 
communicate the Word of God. 
Precisely because liturgical music serves as a proclamation of the Word, Benedict 
is able to scrutinize its practice in a critical manner. Not just any music may proclaim the 
Word; the Word has limits. Specifically, the Word is directly linked to “the word-
relatedness, the rationality, the intelligibility, and the sobriety of the Christian liturgy.”6 In 
this respect Benedict emphasizes the term “sober inebriation.” The Spirit indeed brings 
the church into a kind of ecstatic existence, leaving its sense behind. One might even 
think of a Pentecostal speaking of tongues, as the person receiving a Word from God is 
entirely possessed by that Word, thus communicating an apparent nonsense. But the 
Word is not nonsense—it is entirely sensible.  
It is above all in Church music that the ‘sober inebriation’ of faith takes 
place—an inebriation surpassing all the possibilities of mere rationality. 
But this intoxication remains sober, because Christ and the Holy Spirit 
belong together, because this drunken speech stays totally within the 
discipline of the Logos, in a new rationality that, beyond all words, serves 
the primordial Word, the ground of all reason.7 
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Because the Word is expanded by music, art, and other liturgical practices, it does not 
follow for Benedict (as for Barth) that the Word does not provide limits. By virtue of its 
very nature as logos, the Word has particular attributes that define its actualization. As 
will be demonstrated in this chapter, Pope Benedict XVI’s critical reflection on music 
according to the logos provides a direct critique of modern philosophies of music that are 
opposed to that Word. 
 
BENEDICT’S DOGMATIC REFLECTIONS ON MUSIC 
Church and culture 
Benedict grounds his dogmatic reflections on contemporary sacred music in the historical 
tradition of countering the threat of inculturation vis-à-vis the ecclesial practice of music. 
He opens his essay, “Musica e liturgia,” with a historical account of the Church’s struggle 
against inculturation in its musical practice.8 Throughout this narrative, it is evident that 
Benedict’s primary suspicion is that of inculturation, in which non-Christian modes of 
thought and behavior infiltrate the ecclesial practice of music, thus perverting 
proclamation into something other than the Word of God. In the biblical world, he argues, 
the threat of inculturation came from the temptation to overwhelm with power. As 
Benedict surveys the biblical literature—from psalmic harps and lyres to the apocalyptic 
song of the Lamb—he draws a conclusion rhetorically related to trends in contemporary 
worship music: “The paradox now becomes even more powerful. It is not the gigantic 
beasts of prey, with their power over the media and their technical strength, who win the 
victory. No, it is the sacrificed Lamb that conquers….Liturgical singing is established in 
the midst of this great historical tension.”9 An analogue with contemporary media-driven 
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liturgies is apparent in Benedict’s rhetoric, as he clearly prefers a more reserved aesthetic 
of sacred music. 
In the early and medieval church, Benedict recounts, the ecclesial practice of 
music was easily co-opted by mysticism: “As the Church was uprooted from her Semitic 
soil and moved into the Greek world, a spontaneous and far-reaching fusion took place 
with Greek logos mysticism, with its poetry and music, that eventually threatened to 
dissolve Christianity into a generalized mysticism.”10 Benedict has in mind here the 
ancient mystery cults, as well as Gnosticism, against which early Christianity had to 
distinguish itself. Given how prevalent such “generalized mysticisms” are in the 
contemporary world, however, he likely has an additional target in mind—one which 
often claims the moniker, “spiritual, but not religious.”11  
In the late medieval world, the technical complexities made possible by 
developments in polyphony, the utilization of instruments, and the employment of secular 
music forms began to overshadow the original purpose of sacred music. Instead, artistry 
began to create its own ends, in contradistinction to serving the Word. 
It is clear that these opportunities for artistic creativity and the adoption of 
secular tunes brought danger with them. Music was no longer developing 
out of prayer, but, with the new demand for artistic autonomy, was now 
heading away from the liturgy; it was becoming an end in itself, opening 
the door to new, very different ways of feeling and of experiencing the 
world. Music was alienating the liturgy from its true nature.12  
 
Thus Benedict turns to the Council of Trent’s pronouncements as an intervention to 
counteract the increasing notion of “art for art’s sake”: “It was made a norm that liturgical 
music should be at the service of the Word; the use of instruments was substantially 
reduced; and the difference between secular and sacred music was clearly affirmed.”13  
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The Baroque era then developed that which had been laid down at Trent; it 
“succeeded in dedicating the whole luminous power of music…to the glorifying of 
God.”14 Bach and Mozart are named in particular here, as Benedict describes the inner 
dynamics of their music: “Subjective experience and passion are still held in check by the 
order of the musical universe, reflecting as it does the order of the divine creation itself. 
But there is already the threat of invasion by the virtuoso mentality, the vanity of 
technique, which is no longer the servant of the whole but wants to push itself to the 
fore.”15 In the nineteenth century, “this led in many places to the obscuring of the sacred 
by the operatic.”16 This in turn led to Pope Pius X’s declaration of Gregorian Chant and 
Counter-Reformation polyphony (e.g. Palestrina) as canonical for liturgical music, and a 
further distinction between what constitutes liturgical music over against merely 
“religious” music.17 
 Repeatedly, Benedict describes a cultural crisis in sacred music and its 
corresponding dogmatic restriction, all of which serves to bolster his own restrictions 
against certain contemporary forms of liturgical music. Contemporary sacred music, then, 
is for Benedict yet another development in the same historical continuum, in which 
culture threatens proclamation more than it provides the site for proclamation. A 
pragmatic note is evident, however, in Benedict’s historical theology of music. He 
nowhere claims that the aesthetic decisions of the church have a timeless, universal 
validity. Rather, the church must constantly renew its dogmatic reflections based on the 
threat of inculturation. In his account of the early struggle against mysticism, for instance. 
Benedict calls attention to a fourth-century debate regarding the psalter, in which non-
scriptural hymns were forbidden by the Council of Laodicea. “We may regret the cultural 
                                                 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. Although Mozart is not generally considered baroque, one may affirm his location within the 
development referenced here without too much debate. 
16
 Ibid., 146. 
17
 Ibid., 147. 
88 
impoverishment this entailed, but it was necessary for the sake of a greater good. A return 
to apparent cultural poverty saved the identity of biblical faith, and the very rejection of 
false inculturation opened up the cultural breadth of Christianity for the future.”18 The 
critical point, of course, is in identifying which musical practices are necessary to exclude 
and which of those, posing no threat, may enrich the “cultural breadth” of the Church.19 
Three cultural threats to contemporary sacred music are identified by Benedict: 
cultural universalization, the elitism of the Western art music tradition, and the 
degeneration that has taken place within popular music.20 Focusing his attention on the 
first and third of these aesthetic antagonists, Benedict finds fault with both rock and pop 
music as compromising the church’s proclamation.21  
On the one hand, there is pop music, which is….aimed at the phenomenon 
of the masses, is industrially produced, and ultimately has to be described 
as a cult of the banal. ‘Rock’, on the other hand, is the expression of 
elemental passions, and at rock festivals it assumes a cultic character, a 
form of worship, in fact, in opposition to Christian worship.”22  
 
The former is boring, condensing the cultural diversity of the world into a singular 
mass market; the latter is idolatrous, proposing a new object of worship other than 
the triune God. 
Benedict intends his own dogmatic reflections on ecclesial musical practice to 
maintain the tradition of countering inculturation from outwith the Church. His 
positioning of these reflections within a historical theology of music bolsters his argument 
with the weight of tradition. But the element that is most characteristic is the dialectical 
character of his reflections, as they continually argue against modes of thought and 
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practice that he finds are alien to the logos. In such a manner, Benedict truly provides a 
dogmatic approach to music as proclamation of the Word of God. 
 
Attributes of the logos 
In the course of being proclaimed, then, the Word draws liturgical practices (i.e. music) 
unto itself. Such a claim begs the question of what difference this Word, the divine logos, 
makes. How does the sacred-profane distinction present itself within the practice of 
music?23 If one is to accept—and critically examine—music as a practice that dares to 
proclaim the very Word of God, what types of characteristics should one expect? In 
answering these questions, Benedict identifies the distinctive attributes of proper sacred 
music in regards to the logos, thereby distinguishing such music from other musics. 
Benedict examines three attributes of liturgical music properly inhabited by the 
logos. Although he never names these characteristics in a succinct manner, they may fall 
under the following terms: textuality, rationality, and cosmicality. First, liturgical music 
accompanies liturgical words. “[T]he relation of liturgical music to logos means, first of 
all, simply its relation to words. That is why singing in the liturgy has priority over 
instrumental music, though it does not in any way exclude it.”24 Perhaps the most obvious 
example of relating words to liturgical music may be found in the practice of Gregorian 
chant. As one publication from the Abbey of St Pierre in Solesmes observes: “The 
Gregorian repertoire finds its first source in the cantillation of the Word of God, that is, in 
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the public reading of Holy Scripture.”25 Thus Gregorian chant “musifies” the words of 
scripture in order to proclaim them.  
Of course Gregorian chant is not the only manner of envisioning the relation. The 
Word’s musical accompaniment may be intermittent or contemporaneous with the words 
of the service, providing instrumental reflection on spoken words, or melodic inflection to 
words sung or chanted. Keeping within the tradition of Catholic reflections on sacred 
music, Benedict insists that it is the words that are primary. “It goes without saying that 
the biblical and liturgical texts are the normative words from which liturgical music has to 
take its bearings. This does not rule out the continuing creation of ‘new songs’, but 
instead inspires them….”26 Indeed, Benedict’s conception of the musical proclamation of 
the Word is not so bold as to ignore words altogether. Rather, the non-textualness of 
liturgical music is best understood as a supplement to liturgical words. 
In a rare exposition on Thomas Aquinas, Benedict defends the practice of purely 
instrumental music within the sacred liturgy. Arguing Thomas contra Thomas, he takes 
the following statement regarding the textual nature of the musified Word from the 
medieval scholastic: “‘Even if those who listen sometimes do not understand the words 
being sung, they do understand the reason for the singing, namely, the praise of God. And 
that is sufficient to arouse men to worship.’”27 Here we see perhaps the most direct 
incorporation of the non-textual in Benedict’s theology of the Word. Even lacking 
congregational comprehension of the words, the Word may be proclaimed through music. 
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In this respect, Thomas’ case for a Latin liturgy leads Benedict to argue for the possibility 
of purely instrumental sacred music. To be sure, Benedict is cautious regarding music that 
lacks vocal performance: “Perhaps it should be said that, where an instrument is 
concerned, there is a greater possibility of alienation from the spirit than in the case of the 
voice; music can slip away from or turn against the spirit, the more remote it is from the 
human being.”28 But this does not hinder Benedict from making a direct connection 
between the liturgical use of Latin and purely instrumental music. Neither aural 
phenomena—Latin speech or instrumental music—are necessarily comprehended by the 
congregation; but such incomprehension does not mitigate their relation to words and, 
thereby, the Word. Thus Benedict upholds the attribute of textuality over against a 
complete inattention to scriptural revelation. 
Secondly, while liturgical music may present to the listener something more than 
words, it is not irrational. Benedict’s “musified” Word coheres with an understanding of 
logos as reason. The “sober inebriation” of the Spirit’s work in the incarnation is crucial: 
“Words are superseded, but not the Word, the Logos….The Church’s Tradition has this in 
mind when it talks about the sober inebriation caused in us by the Holy Spirit. There is 
always an ultimate sobriety, a deeper rationality, resisting any decline into irrationality 
and immoderation.”29 Following this characterization of liturgical music as shaped by 
reason, Benedict imports an interesting aesthetic paradigm: the distinction between 
“Apollonian” and “Dionysian.”30 The former is held to be closer to the Spirit of the Word, 
as it “is the music that draws senses into spirit and so brings man to wholeness. It does 
not abolish the senses, but inserts them into the unity of this creature that is man. It 
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elevates the senses by uniting them with the spirit.”31 The latter, however, is alien to the 
rational Word, as it “drags man into the intoxication of the senses, crushes rationality, and 
subjects the spirit to the senses.”32 Thus Benedict maintains the attribute of rationality 
over against a pure sensuality that ignores the spirit.33 
From the ultimate rationality of the Word and its music follows Benedict’s claim 
that liturgical music involves the entire cosmos within the liturgy. Depending heavily 
upon Augustine’s appropriation of a Pythagorean-mathematical conception of music, 
Benedict appropriates a sort of “harmony of the spheres”:  
The courses of the revolving planets are like melodies, the numerical order 
is the rhythm, and the concurrence of the individual courses is the 
harmony. The music made by man must…be taken from the inner music 
and order of the universe….The beauty of music depends on its conformity 
to the rhythmic and harmonic laws of the universe. The more that human 
music adapts itself to the musical laws of the universe, the more beautiful 
it will be.34 
 
In this respect, Benedict’s approach to the doctrine of incarnation coheres with a doctrine 
of creation. “The mathematics of the universe does not exist by itself, nor…can it be 
explained by stellar deities. It has a deeper foundation: the mind of the Creator. It comes 
from the Logos, in whom, so to speak, the archetypes of the world’s order are 
contained.”35 The pre-existent Word of God is co-eternal with the Father, preceding and 
participating in the creation of the cosmos. As a rational component of the created order, 
music practiced by the church—as proclamation—must also reflect (or express) this 
cosmological breadth. Benedict affirms the attribute of cosmicality over against the 
modern turn away from classical Western musical aesthetics to a radical subjectivism. 
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Benedict is not interested in theories of subjective taste and their challenge to aesthetic 
normativity. Rather, he finds normativity in an objective Word of God. 
Textuality, rationality and cosmicality—these are the attributes of a logos-
inhabited music according to Benedict. Such characteristics are necessary to retain in any 
reforms of liturgical music. Within the ebb and flow of the historical nexus, the 
characteristics of the logos must be maintained if music is to proclaim that logos. As 
proclamation of the Word of God, liturgical music participates in the very salvation of the 
created order. “This, then, is the liturgy’s essence: to transpose the cosmos, to spiritualise 
it into the gesture of praise through song and thus to redeem it; to “humanise” the 
world.”36 Thus musical dogmatics for Benedict are a way to ensure that the magnanimity 
of sacred music’s task is preserved and fulfilled. Textuality, rationality and cosmicality 
are at the heart of this essence for Benedict. The greatness of a “cosmic” liturgy that 
emerges from the very Word of God becomes action; it is made “visible and concrete.” 
Words, reason, and the universe are made real in sacred music. By maintaining these 
characteristics within sacred music, Benedict is simply concerned to preserve music’s 
purpose as participating in the continual communication of God’s Word in Christ through 
the Spirit. 
  
Apollo contra Dionysus 
The primary aesthetic distinction that Benedict makes throughout his writings on sacred 
music is the paradigm of the Apollonian versus the Dionysian. The former refers to a 
rational, supersensual approach to aesthetics; the latter emphasizes the sensual and 
ecstatic side of music. It is the contemporary threat of the Dionysian element that 
Benedict fears may inculturate the musical practice of the Church. If the hyper-sensual 
approach to music was simply a matter of radically subjective taste without objective 
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value, Benedict would not object. But he identifies an explicitly non-Christian 
anthropology and soteriology in music of this type. In his use of the Apollonian-
Dionysian paradigm, Benedict is primarily concerned with the salvation of the flesh by 
the spirit, in contrast to the liberation and enlightenment posed by modern philosophies. 
In contrast to both idealist and strict materialist philosophies, Benedict promotes 
an incarnational anthropology that holds spirit and flesh in concert. Benedict claims that 
while his critique of church music has been based on spiritualization, it should be 
understood as a proper spiritualization, which includes the corporeal as spiritually 
transformed.37 The spiritualizing tendency of Platonism, he finds, is helpful to a degree, 
and concedes that both it and Christianity “pursue parallel courses for quite a distance.”38 
But while admitting that there can and must be a “genuine communion of interest” 
between the two worldviews, he insists that an incarnational Christology includes the 
body within spiritualization, rather than opposing the two realms.39  
Unlike the Platonic and idealist traditions, Benedict is not critical of the sensual 
body in general, but rather affirms that the incarnation tames this aspect of humanity and 
draws it within the more rational, divine logos. “Spiritualization of the senses is the true 
spiritualization of the spirit.”40 Benedict merely insists upon a properly Christian 
anthropology, in which the senses need deliverance from sin and to be drawn within the 
spiritual.  
Proper liturgical music, then,  
must be ordered to that integration of human being that appears before us 
in faith in the Incarnation. Such a redemption is more laborious than that 
of intoxication. But this labor is the exertion of truth itself. In one respect, 
it must integrate the senses into the spirit….Every sensual pleasure is 
strictly circumscribed and is ultimately incapable of intensification 
because the sense act cannot exceed a certain measure. …[T]hrough 
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integration into the spirit, the senses receive a new depth and reach into the 
infinity of the spiritual adventure.”41  
 
The sensual, Benedict argues here, must be drawn into the life of the spirit—invigorated 
in the service of something other, rather than exhausting the body’s own limitations with 
overuse. To this end, Benedict asserts again that music should be ordered towards the 
logos. “Does [music] integrate man by drawing him to what is above, or does it cause his 
disintegration into formless intoxication or mere sensuality? That is the criterion for a 
music in harmony with the logos, a form of that logikē latreia (reason-able, logos-worthy 
worship)….”42 The logos draws the body to “what is above,” that is, something other 
than the self’s own body and senses. Thus the spirit draws the body away from itself in 
order to realize its freedom in love. 
Benedict’s concern with the philosophical anthropology reflected in Dionysian 
music leads into his concern that music’s portrayal of subjectivity may point toward a 
soteriology that is alien to the Christian position. Specifically, he maintains that rock 
music “seeks redemption” in ways that are contrary to Christian notions of freedom and 
responsibility. Rock music for him takes “a very precise position on the anarchical ideas 
of freedom which predominate today….But precisely for that reason, it is thoroughly 
opposed to the Christian notion of redemption and of freedom as its exact 
contradiction.”43 The liberation of the individual is presented by rock music in terms of 
denying the self rather than embracing a transformed self. 
People are, so to speak, released from themselves by the experience of 
being part of a crowd and by the emotional shock of rhythm, noise, and 
special lighting effects. However, in the ecstasy of having all their 
defenses torn down, the participants sink, as it were, beneath the elemental 
force of the universe. The music of the Holy Spirit’s sober inebriation 
seems to have little chance when self has become a prison, the mind is a 
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shackle, and breaking out from both appears as a true promise of 
redemption that can be tasted at least for a few moments.44 
 
This dissolution of subjectivity is, for Benedict, altogether different from what is meant 
by salvation in the Christian sense.  
For Benedict, religion and music are very close in their inclination to descend 
toward the Dionysian: “In not a few forms of religion, music is ordered to intoxication 
and ecstasy. …Such music lowers the barriers of individuality and of personality. Man 
frees himself in it from the burden of consciousness. Music becomes ecstasy, liberation 
from the ego, and unification with the universe.”45 One must be careful, then, to 
distinguish liberation from the body and salvation of the body. Incarnational theology 
does not teach that the body and its senses are to be dissolved or annihilated, but rather 
transformed, renewed and properly oriented in the spirit of Christ. 
 In the contemporary world, Benedict claims, the “profane return” of such cultic 
music is found in rock and pop, “the festivals of which are an anti-culture of the same 
orientation—the pleasure of destruction, the abolition of everyday barriers, and the 
illusion of liberation from the ego in the wild ecstasy of noise and masses.”46 Rock music, 
for Benedict, is a kind of liturgical music, but one that is of an entirely different church 
than that instituted by Christ. “This imbalance toward the senses recurs in modern popular 
music: the ‘God’ found here, the salvation of man identified here, is quite different from 
the God of the Christian faith.”47 More specifically, for Benedict, “Through rhythm and 
melody themselves, pagan music often endeavors to elicit an ecstasy of the senses, but 
without elevating the senses into the spirit; on the contrary, it attempts to swallow up the 
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spirit in the senses as a means of release.”48 Thus the reason for Benedict’s antagonism 
toward rock and pop is not an aesthetic decision based on his own subjective taste, but is 
rooted in his observation of theological doctrines in such musical practices that are 
diametrically opposed to Christian faith. 
In his use of the Apollonian-Dionysian paradigm, then, Benedict is primarily 
concerned that music’s engagement with the body may contradict the incarnational 
emphasis on the rational Word redeeming the sensual. While he careful not to appropriate 
the typology too literally (conceding that “Apollo is not Christ”), Benedict nevertheless 
continues to depend upon this paradigm.49 What one cannot ignore in his use of this 
typology, however, is his dialectical dependence upon the modern philosophical ideas 
upon which the typology is based. That is, in adopting this philosophically charged 
paradigm, Benedict is reacting against a particular movement in modern philosophy that 
had already claimed the typology for its own purposes. By tracing a genealogy of this 
movement, one may better grasp the dialectical nature of Benedict’s dogmatic reflections 
on music. 
 
A GENEALOGY OF MODERN MUSICAL HERESY 
Benedict’s logos-driven dogmatic reflections on music—specifically his use of the 
Apollonian-Dionysian typology—are philosophically informed, as he weaves through 
both ancient and modern aesthetics. He is careful, however, to engage such philosophies 
in an exceptionally implicit manner. Benedict does not name the philosophers with whom 
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he engages. Given what he does say, however, it is possible to reconstruct a genealogy of 
Benedict’s philosophical foil. 
Benedict is careful to distinguish a cosmically incarnational theology of music 
from modern philosophies of music. “The cosmic character of liturgical music stands in 
opposition to the two tendencies of the modern age…: music as pure subjectivity, music 
as the expression of mere will. We sing with the angels. But this cosmic character is 
grounded ultimately in the ordering of all Christian worship to logos.”50 The former refers 
to Hegel’s absolute Geist; the latter to the Wille of Schopenhauer, which prioritizes action 
before reason.51 In contradistinction from these modern philosophies, Benedict espouses 
Guardini’s contribution to liturgical theology, the priority of logos before ethos.52 
Benedict’s distinction here between the primacy of the logos in Christian thought and the 
idealist strands of modern philosophy is fundamental to understanding the project that 
Benedict takes up in his reflections on music. The origin of Benedict’s aesthetic antithesis 
in his critical reflections on ecclesial music may ultimately be located in Kant’s severance 
of the sublime from its ancient rhetorical roots. By challenging this strand of modern 
philosophy, Benedict continues the dogmatic project of challenging the non-Christian 
inculturation of the ecclesial practice of music.  
 
Nietzsche’s Dionysian Pessimism 
As stated earlier, Benedict’s employment of an Apollonian-Dionysian paradigm 
inexorably places him in conversation with Friedrich Nietzsche.53 In the latter’s first 
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book, The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, the author ingeniously fused 
classical philology and German idealist philosophy to critique his contemporary culture.54 
As he viewed the circumstance of art in late-nineteenth century Germany, it had become 
too removed from the unity of thought and action, reflection and performance, that he 
found in ancient Greek tragedy. Nietzsche demanded the return of Dionysian aesthetic 
elements, so that modern culture would be redeemed and transformed to once again 
celebrate the tragic chaos that pervades existence. Nietzsche’s Dionysian exemplifies a 
reaction against modern secular reason, but—as Benedict demonstrates—while much of 
Nietzsche’s criticism is justified, it is often misplaced. 
A primary resource of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy is Schopenhauer’s The 
World as Will and Representation. He refers to it throughout, even quoting 
Schopenhauer’s passage on music in full.55 Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian loosely 
correspond to Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung and Wille, respectively. As Vorstellung, 
Schopenhauer’s world is the idealist representation of things, as opposed to things 
themselves.56 In this manner Schopenhauer continues the Kantian idealist tradition. But as 
Wille, Schopenhauer’s world is also the movement of his body.57 Nietzsche’s Apollonian 
and Dionysian follow this pattern: the former is found the art of sculpture, the latter in the 
moving art of music.58 The former exemplifies Schopenhauer’s principium 
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individuationis; the latter dissolves individuals to experience their unity with the world in 
a state of “self-annihilation.” The former resides in the fictitious dreams of the mind, the 
latter in intoxication and ecstasy of the senses.59 
The relation between these two aesthetic elements, however, is complicated. In 
one sense, Nietzsche adopts Schiller’s proto-Hegelian methodology, advocating a “binary 
synthesis” of Apollo and Dionysus.60 In §21, he employs familial language of a “fraternal 
bond” (einen Bruderbund) between the two gods.61 Benjamin Bennett has argued (against 
Walter Kaufmann) that the Dionysian and Apollonian elements are not “pure” in their 
primitive, isolated state, but rather become pure only when they are in proper balance.62 
On the other hand, Nietzsche seems to pit the two against each other in a continual 
struggle, privileging Dionysus (as Schopenhauer prioritizes the Wille) in order to 
overcome the modern tyranny of Apollo.63 Nietzsche describes how Apollo “tears man 
up” and “tears us away” from Dionysus, and then how “the Dionysian again achieves 
predominance” and “at the most essential point that Apollonian illusion is broken through 
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and annihilated.”64 Nietzsche is ambiguous, therefore, in whether he prefers the 
Dionysian to take precedence or achieve a proper balance with the Apollonian.65  
Nietzsche observes that the musical aspect of Greek tragedy, however, is 
Dionysian. One of the many tasks of The Birth of Tragedy was to outline the relation 
between music and language (a hot topic in musical aesthetics in the wake of Hanslick’s 
On the Beautiful in Music, which was originally published in 1854 and moved through 
ten editions). As a project of classical philology, Nietzsche addressed the loss of 
awareness of the musico-speech culture of ancient Greece. Reading Greek through Latin 
lenses had distorted the natural rhythm of long and short syllables in Greek, so that the 
ancient musical poetry was (wrongly) assumed to follow the model of stressed 
syllables.66 He further associated the “spirit of music” with Dionysus, particularly in 
regards to the tragic struggle over individuation. Kathleen Marie Higgins has written that, 
in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche “links Dionysus to a mode of self-awareness that is 
characterized by a forgetting of all that is individual and by a sense of oneness with the 
rest of humanity and the rest of nature.”67 It is music that “restores such awareness,” 
however, as “Language depends on, yet does not communicate, the Dionysian awareness 
of oneness with the world.”68 Music, furthermore, serves as a “transcendental 
precondition for the possibility of language.”69 Despite the ambiguity regarding whether 
Dionysus should be fraternally bonded or à la mode, then, the musical aesthetic of 
Nietzsche clearly highlights the latter. 
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Nietzsche advocates both Apollonian and Dionysian in concert, but nevertheless 
he emphasizes the latter due to the dominance of the former in modern thought. The 
pendulum swung back and forth between the two in ancient Greece, but Nietzsche claims 
that, ever since that “theoretical man” (theoretischen Menschen) par excellence, Socrates, 
the West has been trapped under the tyranny of Apollo.70 Nietzsche even considers the 
situation unfortunate that no one has been able to find the necessary hemlock by which to 
overthrow such domination.71 In the realm of tragedy, it was Socrates’ friend, Euripides, 
who definitively tarnished Dionysus’ reputation in The Bacchae.72 Furthermore, in §18, 
he congratulates Kant & Schopenhauer for “winning the most difficult victory, the victory 
over the optimism which lies hidden in the essence of logic, the optimism which is also 
the substratum (der Untergrund) of our culture.”73 Thus Nietzsche comes to advocate a 
kind of pessimism, but one augmented with Dionysian performance so to be positive and 
life-affirming.74  
But in theological perspective, it should be recognized that Nietzsche’s critique 
works best as a critique of modern secular reason, not the rationality of the Christian 
logos.75 This is most evident when examining Kant’s analytic of the sublime. James 
Kirwan has observed that the “sublime” features prominently in Nietzsche’s early work 
(i.e. The Birth of Tragedy), and that his notion of Dionysian art has “obvious affinities” 
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with the sublime.76 Furthermore, Schopenhauer’s aesthetic, which was deeply influential 
for Nietzsche, also extends Kant’s discussion of the sublime.77 What these observations 
mean, however, will be explored in the next section. Nietzsche’s Dionysian, then, 
represents a reaction against a tyranny of reason in modern thought. In Pope Benedict’s 
own use of the Apollonian-Dionysian paradigm, he implicitly deconstructs Nietzschean 
aesthetics in order to correct the trajectory of this reaction and defend the normative 
rationality of the logos. 
 
The Kantian Sublime  
Much of Nietzsche’s philosophy is a rejection of the idealism and romanticism that 
followed in the wake of Kant’s critical philosophy, although it unfortunately accepts 
many of Kant’s assumptions without criticism. As John Walker has noted, “Nietzsche’s 
attack on metaphysics…retains essentially Kantian premises.”78 In addition, Nick Land 
has traced Nietzsche’s notion of the Dionysian to its roots in Kant’s description of the 
sublime.79 It is in Kant’s “Analytic of the Sublime” that a supersensible reason—not 
unlike Nietzsche’s Apollonian type—is pitted over and against the lower faculties of 
perception and imagination. Kant succeeded in critiquing the same optimism that 
Nietzsche rejects in his first critique (see Transcendental Dialectic section), but he 
elevated reason beyond measure in his analytic of the sublime. 
Crucial to understanding Kant’s notion of the sublime is that the objects of 
aesthetic judgment are not sublime. Their presentation to the perceiving subject is what 
may be properly called sublime, as the sublime cannot be contained within “sensuous 
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form”; it concerns rather the ideas of reason.80 Kant defines the aesthetic category of the 
sublime as that which is “absolutely great” (schlechthin groß).81 Erhaben ist das, mit 
welchem in Vergleichung alles andere klein ist.82The sublime is so “great,” in fact, that it 
“evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense."83 
 Unpacking this, Kant delineates two types within the sublime: the mathematisch 
and the dynamisch.84The former describes the aesthetic feelings arising from an encounter 
with magnitude (Größenschätzung) and the latter with those that encounter some form of 
power (Macht; Gewalt).85 When the perception of magnitudes or powers exceeds the 
limits of the imagination, aesthetic judgment is overwhelmed and the feeling of the 
sublime thus arises.86 Kant also identifies a curious combination of aesthetic pleasure and 
pain in encountering the sublime. Pain arises from the imagination’s struggle and 
subsequent failure to surpass its limits.87 But then the subject’s reason—that 
“supersensible” (übersinnlich) faculty of the mind which “transcends every standard of 
sensibility” (übertrifft allen Maßstab der Sinnlichkeit)—intercedes in order that the 
subject may comprehend such greatness, up to and including infinity.88 An aesthetic 
pleasure then results, as the subject marvels in his or her own faculty of reason. Again, 
sublimity is not found in objects of perception, but in the subject’s own mind. Thereby 
one’s imagination—along with any and all objects that the world has to offer up to one’s 
aesthetic judgment—must “sink into insignificance before the ideas of reason.”89 
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 Despite Kant’s limits of rationality in his first critique, the third critique provides 
an opportunity to re-enthrone reason in its tyranny over all else. “Reason exerts a 
dominion over sensibility….”90 This rejection of sensibility and elevation of reason 
beyond measure is precisely the audacity of the German idealist tradition. Schiller, in his 
1795 work, On the Sublime, claimed that “The sublime creates for us a way out of the 
sensuous world.”91 As Mark Evan Bonds has astutely observed in his study of Music as 
Thought, “the sublime was more than a matrix of aesthetic qualities: it was perceived by 
many as an epistemological means toward the integration of the finite and the infinite.”92 
Furthermore, he writes, “the object of description” in musical aesthetics “had shifted from 
music’s effect to music’s essence or, more specifically, to the perception of an ideal realm 
reflected in that music.”93 The pragmatics of musical practice was disappearing; instead 
an “absolute music” began to usurp its place in the musical aesthetics of the eighteenth 
century.94 Such idealism is portrayed in Peter Shaffer’s Amadeus, in which Antonio 
Salieri reads a draft of Mozart’s Twenty-ninth Symphony and marvels at how it perfectly 
transcribes that which was already complete in the mind of the genius himself (while the 
audience unfortunately requires an audible performance simultaneous to his reading): “I 
was staring through the cage of those meticulous ink strokes at—an Absolute Beauty!”95 
It is this unrealistic dominance of reason that Schopenhauer rejects in his primacy of 
Wille; it is this tyranny that Nietzsche rejects in his (albeit balanced) preference for the 
Dionysian. Although Nietzsche (following Schopenhauer) rejects this idealism of the 
Kantian sublime, he allows that same idealism to exhaust his definition of the Apollonian. 
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 But such an idealist representation of rationality is not the Christian logos—and 
that is what Benedict is keen to point out in his dogmatic description of the Apollonian 
type. By explicitly countering Hegelian subjectivity and the primacy of Schopenhauer’s 
Wille with Guardini’s primacy of the logos, as well as his repeated critical attention to the 
Apollonian-Dionysian paradigm, Benedict addresses the philosophical heresy in modern 
musical aesthetics. By doing so he participates in the Catholic dogmatic tradition of 
critiquing contemporary culture by means of the normative divine logos. 
 
Learning to Count: logic, rhetoric and modulation 
Another aspect of modern musical heresy that Benedict does not address, however, is the 
loss of the rhetorical locus of sublimity. Such a critique is entirely consistent with his 
dogmatic approach, however. It is included here to supplement Benedict’s approach, as 
well as demonstrate his similarity with contemporary theological attention to the Kantian 
sublime. John Milbank has attended to the sublime and its audacious claim to usurp the 
transcendence of God with the greatness of human reason.96 Milbank’s argument applies 
to the matter of music particularly in regards to his assertion that modern thought has lost 
the rhetorical locus of sublimity, as originally outlined in Longinus’ initial manifesto on 
the subject.97 Consistent with Milbank’s position, then, is an Augustinian approach to 
musical mensuratio that reveals the pitfalls of Kant’s account of measuring magnitude in 
his Analytic of the Sublime. 
 When Kant outlines the “judgment of measurement” in §26 of the Analytic, he is 
more interested in the logic of mathematics than its rhetoric. He describes counting as the 
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“successive aggregation of units” in which the imagination “advances ad infinitum.”98 It 
is the faculty of understanding that assists the imagination in this respect, in that it 
contains the concepts necessary to repeat counting in Euclidean orders (e.g. repeating 
digits after ten, as in the decimal scale, or after two, as in binary code). Thus in the act of 
counting, the mind compensates for the limitations of the lower faculties of imagination 
and perception.  
 Augustine also presents Euclidean mathematics in his description of the practice 
of musical mensuratio in book one of De Musica: “although as we have said numbers 
progress to infinity, men have made certain articulations in counting by which they return 
again and again to one, the beginning or principle of numbers. For, in counting, we 
progress from one to ten, and from there we return to one.”99 But later in book six, 
Augustine incorporates this practice of counting musical time into a kind of doctrine of 
mathematical ascension. This Augustinian version of the sublime, however, has nothing 
to do with the audacious idealism of Kant and his followers. By attending to the counting 
of music, Augustine utilizes the “rhetorical perspective on sublimity” espoused by 
Milbank. Augustine does not count in order to marvel at his own reason; instead he allows 
himself to be lifted by a more perfect rhythm that comes from without. Augustine does all 
this in a study of the Ambrosian hymn, Deus creator omnium. The cosmological 
statement that God is Creator of all—and therefore Lord of all—thereby guides every 
perception, measurement and action into right order. To confess Deus creator omnium is 
to exercise prudence, the initial virtue that subsequently leads the soul through 
temperance and fortitude to justice, finally culminating in the telos of sanctification. Thus 
the final book of De Musica gleans the fruit from classical music theory and replants it in 
an explicitly theological project. 
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 An Augustinian approach to the practice of counting musical time is parallel to 
Benedict’s privileging of the Apollonian over the Dionysian. It is in reflection upon 
musical practice that the logos has priority over ethos. In the practice of counting rhythm, 
one is led into an awareness of the ebb and flow of the temporal cosmos. Augustine does 
not butcher time along the lines of a Kantian “successive aggregation of units” that has no 
respect for the particularity of those units and the rhetorical shape they collectively grant 
to the movement of time.100 In reflecting upon that musical rhetoric, then, one able to be 
brought up into the virtuous life of the spirit that pervades and redeems the particularities 
of performance. 
   
PRINCIPLES OF PARTICULARITY  
One final observation should be made regarding Benedict’s dogmatic reflections on 
music—one which addresses his refusal to allow rock and pop into the musical practice of 
the Church. One immediate criticism that comes to mind is that Benedict is himself an 
aesthetic tyrant who privileges the universal over against particularity.101 But such 
criticism too quickly ignores much of what he has to say about the ecclesial practice of 
music.  
In Benedict’s strict stance against cultural universalization, for instance, he 
dismisses pop precisely on the grounds that it presents a “music of the masses”; that is, it 
is pop music that destroys particularity, not its prohibition. Benedict is concerned that 
music as a commercial enterprise threatens to alleviate cultural particularity in favor of 
appeasing the mass populace with homogeneity. Thus he emphasizes the local and 
particular aspects of sacred music when he presents his concerns regarding popular 
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music. By comparing pop music with folk music, Benedict distinguishes between the 
mass society and local communities. “The audience to whom pop music refers is mass 
society. In contrast, folk music…is the musical expression of a clearly defined 
community held together by its language, history, and way of life, which assimilates and 
shapes its experiences in song….”102 Mass society is entirely different from such local 
communities. “The masses as such do not know experiences firsthand; they only know 
reproduced and standardized experiences.”103 This is closely related to his concern with 
preserving personal identity in the life of the spirit—rather than annihilating the self vis-
à-vis the Dionysian—is his critique that such music also destroys cultural distinctions in 
favor of a “music of the masses.” 
The Church does perform its music in a universal fashion, but not in a way that 
destroys cultural particularities. The ecclesial practice of music—as proclamation of the 
cosmic Word—is, for Benedict, a performance by the universal church. “All our singing 
is a singing and a praying with the great liturgy that spans the whole of creation.”104 The 
chant, chorale, hymn, and even the fugue are located not just in their performance on 
Sunday morning by the choir, congregation or organist. The ecclesial practice of music 
involves the entire body of Christ. As one is baptized into the universal church and 
partakes of the resurrected body of Christ, one sings and plays with that same corpus 
mysticum.105  
 Thus, when Benedict establishes “governing principles” for liturgical music in his 
1981 essay, “Theologische Grundlagen der Kirchenmusik,” he begins with the relation 
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between the universal and the particular.106 First, the liturgy and its music is catholic, 
meaning that it is available for everyone. Benedict argues that such catholicity in music 
will tend toward a more “simple” music, but with a simplicity that is more an “expression 
of maturity” than banal.107 Secondly, the liturgy is particular, so that the variety of 
settings and circumstances in local churches will engender an accordingly broad range of 
musical expressions.108 Benedict is surprised and offended by one aspect of postconciliar 
liturgical music, that “postconciliar pluralism has created uniformity in one respect at 
least: it will not tolerate a high standard of expression.”109 Benedict’s sharp rhetoric here 
leads him into an interesting emphasis—that the “whole range of possibilities within the 
unity of the Catholic liturgy” must not be impaired. 
Benedict’s other principles serve to highlight the proper relation between the 
universal and particular. His third principle is that the liturgy must include “active 
participation,” though Benedict creatively affirms that this may be achieved in a variety 
of ways.110 The principle of “active participation,” introduced in Sacrosanctum 
Concilium, is often interpreted as mandating that everyone—priest and congregation—
must assist in the performance of liturgical music.111 This mandate often leads to a 
predominance of congregational hymns or praise songs, as well as the elimination of 
special choirs, as that is assumed to be the easiest way for everyone engage in “active 
participation.”  Such a view, however, is characterized by Benedict as “primitive 
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actionism,” as he interprets the principle of “active participation” differently.112 Each 
person must not necessarily perform along with the community, he argues. The practice 
of listening, rather, is equally active as musical performance. “Are we to compel people 
to sing when they cannot, and, by doing so, silence not only their hearts but the hearts of 
others too?”113 Benedict maintains that those congregants who sing “with the heart” rather 
than “with the mouth” participate just as actively as the cantor or choir. Thus, given his 
own interpretation of this principle, Benedict appears to allow for a greater variety of 
musical proclamation than one might expect from a so-called traditionalist. 
Fourthly, the liturgy must be grand. “The Church must not settle down with what 
is merely comfortable and serviceable at the parish level; she must arouse the voice of the 
cosmos and, by glorifying the Creator, elicit the glory of the cosmos itself, making it also 
glorious, beautiful, habitable and beloved.”114 In this respect, the liturgy must not forget 
its place as God’s Word. That it has such a noble task does not make it metaphysical or 
overly spiritual; rather it must, like the incarnation, allow for human flesh to sing the 
divine. Again, Benedict is not specific in what he regards as fulfilling this principle. 
Whether such music is grandiose in the fashion of the final movement in Beethoven’s 
Ninth Symphony or as complex and full as the opening movement of Tavener’s Fall and 
Resurrection is not specified. From such a loosely defined principle, then, one is inclined 
to conclude that Benedict is, again, generous in allowing for a wide variety of possibilities 
in musical proclamation. 
In order to preserve particularity and variety in musical proclamation, the liturgy 
must finally be willing to include indigenous religious music. Benedict is cautious here, 
however, for he does not wish to jettison the Word in order to adapt to a secular folk 
culture. So Benedict provides an interpretation of the Constitution on the Liturgy that 
                                                 
112
 Ratzinger, “In the Presence of the Angels,” 177-178. 
113
 Ratzinger, “On the Theological Basis of Church Music,” 124. 
114
 Ibid. 
112 
emphasizes the more religious aspect of indigenous music, in order that the church, when 
adapting the musical Word to local cultures, will preserve the sacredness of those cultures 
over the secular aspects.115 “That is why the Church has had to be critical of all ethnic 
music; it could not be allowed untransformed into the sanctuary.”116 Benedict’s caution 
regarding indigenous music may be easily misunderstood as a kind of Western cultural 
elitism.117 But that is not the case; Benedict wishes to eliminate any element of music—
Western or non-Western—that does not conform to the Word of God. “The Church must 
maintain high standards; she must be a place where beauty can be at home; she must lead 
the struggle for that ‘spiritualization’ without which the world becomes ‘the first circle of 
hell’.”118 Benedict is not an iconoclast, hampering cultural efforts toward musical 
proclamation; he simply has “high standards,” demanding that the Church’s music 
proclaim the Word and not some other philosophy. 
 
DOGMATIC REFLECTION ON MUSIC IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE  
One criticism that could be made of Benedict is that he employs philosophical categories 
(as the Apollonian-Dionysian paradigm) without explicitly engaging the primary sources 
from which they emerge. With rare exception, Benedict does not even name the 
philosophers against whom he argues. He either assumes his audience is familiar with the 
philosophical subtext, or he is attempting to avoid confusion with those theologies that 
take their bearings directly from philosophy.119 In any case, Benedict’s dogmatic 
reflections on music resist inculturation from philosophies that are alien to the Christian 
logos.  
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Such resistance is the hallmark of proper dogmatic behavior. Benedict does not 
intend his dogmatic prescriptions for sacred music to inhibit fresh and creative 
expressions of faith. He is quick to affirm that critical engagement with liturgical 
practices pushes those practices into a genuinely creative future. “Normativity, when 
properly understood, does not mean the exclusion of the new, but guidance which points 
one toward what lies on the horizon.”120 To this end one cannot provide dogmatic 
guidance too early. Benedict insists that it is impossible “to lay down a priori musical 
criteria for this spiritualization process,” thus one must reflect and critique the ecclesial 
practice of music that has already been performed and now lies before the church as an 
established act.121 In such a process of practice and reflection the church learns how to 
perform its music. One cannot establish purely positive principles of musical dogmatics; 
one cannot say the church must do music this way, but rather the church must not do 
music that way, as she has learned that way is contrary to the Word of God. Dogmatic 
work of this type, then, is not constructive theology so much as it is descriptive theology.  
Vatican II was well advised, therefore, only to indicate very general 
standards: music must ‘accord with the spirit of the liturgical action’; it 
must be ‘suitable’, or be capable of being ‘made suitable, for sacred use’; 
it must ‘accord with the dignity of the temple’ and ‘truly contribute to the 
edification of the faithful’.122 
 
Keenly aware of the flexibility that must be allowed within such “general standards,” 
Benedict’s position appears to cohere with a kind of “generous orthodoxy,” in which 
sufficient room is given for liturgical innovation and creativity.123 But it is the ecclesial 
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practice of music—and not critical theological reflection on that music—that bears the 
creative responsibility of the Church. 
In another essay, Benedict situates the musical aesthetic of the contemporary 
church as caught between two worlds.124 On one end of the spectrum there is “music of 
the masses” that may be “industrially manufactured and is evaluated by how well it 
sells.”125 On the other end there is high art, “a rationally construed, artificial music with 
the highest technical requirements which is hardly capable of reaching out beyond a 
small, elite circle.”126 Church music, however, settles between these two extremes. 
Benedict finds it inevitable, however, that the church would be tempted to surrender its 
own place and reach for either extreme.127 His problem with the church in such instances 
is that it tends to import culture into the church’s proclamation without exporting its 
witness to that culture. So Benedict insists that “this dialogue must necessarily be 
bilateral.”128 The job of the theologian, in such circumstances, is to look for how faith 
makes room and provides direction for art.  
When theologians try to contribute something in this struggle, they must 
make use of the means available to them. They cannot enter into the 
musical discussions per se, but they can nonetheless ask where the seams 
are, so to speak, that link faith and art. They can try to explain how faith 
prepares an interior place for art and which directives it gives for the path 
of art.129 
 
Benedict insists that sacred music cannot indulge either extreme of high art music or 
popular music for the masses, for “if music crosses these boundaries, it sacrifices the 
culture of faith and hence stops being music from the word of God and for the word of 
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God.”130 Sacred music must not succumb to pure aestheticism, in which art is simply “for 
art’s sake,” for “this presumptuousness necessarily leads to a nihilistic lack of standards 
and therefore generates nihilistic parodies of art, but not a new creativity.”131 Art must be 
in the service of something if it is to be of any value and in the church that is the Word of 
God. Nor must sacred music be tempted to indulge popular culture simply because to do 
so would be pastorally practical. 
Benedict often finds himself responding to issues of musical dogmatics within the 
context of postconciliar disputes regarding the liturgy. Frustrated by “the helpless plight 
of church music that has resulted from the halfhearted realization of liturgical reform,”132 
Benedict takes the current situation and places it in its historical context. For him, the 
liturgy  
always stands in the tension between continuity and renewal. It is always 
growing into new todays, and it must constantly prune the today that has 
become yesterday, so that what is essential may appear vigorous and new. 
Liturgy needs growth as well as cleansing, and the preservation of its 
identity is crucial.133 
 
The preservation of Christian identity in the liturgy is indeed the crucial issue for 
Benedict, as well as for any proper dogmatic reflection on music as proclamation of the 
Word of God. Such dogmatic work cannot look forward; it must always be reflection 
upon existing practice, allowing for new aesthetic patterns and forms, but continually 
shaped by the normative, divine logos.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE DOGMATICS OF MUSIC: 
A CONCLUSION POINTING FORWARD 
 
In his lectures on Schleiermacher, Barth laments how in Schleiermacher’s Christmas Eve 
dialogue, “music is rated above speech.”1 Barth would presumably express a similar 
criticism with regards to Jean-Luc Godard’s film, One Plus One. This dissertation, 
however, does not claim that music is better or worse at proclaiming the gospel than the 
spoken word. Language may indeed be profoundly specific in its communication of 
meaning; words are extraordinary gifts from God for which much praise and thanksgiving 
is due. But God has also granted to humanity the gift of music, a marvelous means by 
which meaning and emotion may be embodied and expressed in terms that our own 
bodies may comprehend.2 Timothy Gorringe rightly asserts that “It is God who is the 
origin of music’s power to express emotion, to lead us to dance, to reduce us to tears. All 
this has its origin in God, and we explore the depths of God’s world and of its imaginative 
possibilities in making music.”3 The originating divine logos is indeed the power behind, 
underneath and in the gift of music. But how does that logos relate to the ecclesial 
practice of music? 
 
FIDES EX AUDITU IN REVIEW 
It has been the primary contention of this dissertation that critical theological reflection 
upon the ecclesial practice of music requires that it is set within the manifold redemptive 
work of the Word of God in Christ through the Church. By pointing to contemporary 
                                                 
1
 Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 210. 
2
 Graham Ward presents an incarnational approach to a phenomenological analysis of touch, but his account 
could easily be augmented with sound, for hearing is, ultimately, a specific kind of touch, vis-à-vis the 
various components of the ear. See Ward, “The Logos, the Body and the World: On the Phenomenological 
Border,” in Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology: Reason, Meaning and Experience, 
edited by Kevin Vanhoozer and Martin Warner, Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 105-126. 
3
 T. J. Gorringe, The Education of Desire: Towards a Theology of the Senses (London: SCM Press, 2001), 
16. 
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“worship wars” as the site where a radically subjective aesthetic of taste has infiltrated the 
Church’s reflections on its musical practices, the introduction demonstrated the current 
need for normative criteria by which such practices may be judged. Various 
contemporary theologies of music were compared, as a “kerygmatic” approach—one 
which views the Church’s music as proclaiming the logos—was finally called for. 
Providing foils for this approach are the natural-theological approach of Blackwell and 
the a-theological approach of Epstein. 
The second chapter, then, demonstrated how Barth’s dogmatic theology, critically 
reflecting on the proclamation of the logos, offers a possible resource for the present 
approach. However, his critical use of a revelatory dialectic prohibits a kerygmatic role 
for music, thus preventing any critical theological reflection upon music as an ecclesial 
practice. Barth’s infamous praise of Mozart was initially examined in order to survey the 
musical territory of Barth studies. Although Barth proposes a normative aesthetic of 
music along formalist lines, his detachment from the Catholic dogmatic tradition restricts 
his reflections to a strictly modern aesthetic framework and he was unable to hear 
anything (besides a meaning-less “play” in music). Further examination of Barth’s early 
writings then revealed how it is Barth’s curious reading of the Auftrag, or “Great 
Commission,” that prohibits an understanding of music’s proclamatory role within church 
practice. The consequences of Barth’s restriction of the dogmatic task are indeed 
disastrous for the ecclesial practice of music. Any church that takes Barth as his word is 
then left to ignore the critical task of reflecting upon its musical performance.  
The third chapter of this dissertation demonstrated that, by remaining within a 
more ancient dogmatic tradition, Pope Benedict XVI (in his writings as Joseph Ratzinger) 
is able to provide critical reflection on music according to the logos. As a ressourcement 
theologian, Benedict’s reflections on music are informed by similar reflections of the 
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ancient Fathers. It was shown how both the Fathers and Benedict’s appropriation of them 
view the ecclesial practice of music as a necessary component of the church’s ministry of 
the Word. The benefit of Benedict’s contribution is that, contra Barth, ecclesial music is 
not left to fend for itself. Critical reflection and guidance is indeed possible for the church 
that understands its music within the normativity of the logos.  
In the fourth chapter, the particulars of Benedict’s dogmatic reflections on the 
ecclesial practice of music were examined and shown to provide a direct critique of 
modern philosophical aesthetics. Like the Fathers, Benedict is wary of inculturation; thus 
his dogmatic reflections on music are usually in dialectical tension with those aesthetics 
that are contrary to the logos. In this respect he utilizes a paradigm taken from Nietzsche 
in order to argue for a Christian rationality. This “Christian Apollonianism” is in contrast 
to the secular and subjective reason of post-Kantian aesthetics. After augmenting 
Benedict’s position with a comparison of Augustine and Kant on the practice of counting, 
it was then shown how Benedict’s incarnational approach to music is reflected in his 
concern with preserving the cultural particularity of the Church’s musical practice. 
Benedict affirms the critical importance of reason and reflection via his espousal of an 
Apollonian aesthetic.4  
 
THE THEOLOGIAN AS MUSIC CRITIC 
In the organic process of practice and reflection the church learns how to perform its 
music. One cannot establish purely positive principles of musical dogmatics; one cannot 
say the church must do music this way, but rather the church must not do music that way, 
as she has learned that way is contrary to the Word of God. Dogmatic work of this type, 
then, is not constructive theology so much as it is descriptive theology. Although this 
                                                 
4
 It is difficult to ignore the fact that both Barth and Benedict are quite aesthetically reserved. The latter, 
however, does not extend these reservations into his dogmatic task. Rather, Benedict’s dogmatic reflections 
on music enable him to shape this somewhat “minimalist” aesthetic, whereas Barth’s lack of dogmatic 
attention toward music paradoxically allows greater cultural influx. 
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dissertation has not the space to examine this fully, one possible instantiation of the 
dogmatic project called for here may utilize the theological method of “theological 
description,” associated with Nicholas Adams and Charles Elliott (among others).5 
If their 2000 essay, “Ethnography is Dogmatics,” is taken as the methodological 
manifesto, the project is an amalgamation of Karl Barth’s injunction that “ethics is 
dogmatics” and Foucault’s introduction to Discipline & Punish, in which the rhetoric of 
Foucault’s purely descriptive text is clearly designed to illuminate an ethical problem and 
provide critical judgment.6 Taken together these two methods amount to the claim that 
descriptive reflection on a given situation, laden with moral judgment, is a useful method 
of doing dogmatics.7 Finding support in the work of Stanley Hauerwas, Samuel Wells and 
William Cavenaugh, descriptive dogmatics allows the particularities of local situations to 
be themselves, without being forced to fit the application of “universal” principles. This 
does not entail an avoidance of normativity, however. Rather, the “ought” is implied in 
and through carefully crafted description of God’s action in the world. Adams and Elliott 
repeatedly insist that “dogmatic clarification does not add anything substantial to the 
description itself,” meaning that the description of a moral situation should be sufficient 
in itself to convey the theological/moral lesson.8 Adding interpretive theological 
statements would only be redundant.9 “Dogmatics is for teaching Christians how to see 
with an eye on transformation.”10 Because God is always acting to liberate the world “to 
                                                 
5
 While the methods are evident in a few, predominantly British, scholars working today, a “Description 
Group” has informally met at the American Academy of Religion since 2004. 
6
 Nicholas Adams and Charles Elliott, “Ethnography is Dogmatics: Making Description Central to 
Systematic Theology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 53 (2000): 339-364; Michel Foucault, Discipline & 
Punish: the birth of the prison (New York: Random House, 1995), 3-7; Barth, Ethics, edited by Dietrich 
Braun, translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (New York: Seabury, 1981), 15. 
7
 Or, put in terms of a summative statement, “ethics is dogmatics” + “ethics is description,” where 
“description = ethnography,” then “ethnography is dogmatics.” See Adams and Elliott, 339f. 
8
 Ibid., 363. 
9
 Graham Ward also finds interpretation inextricable from description, citing Wittgenstein and Heidegger’s 
concurrence that “we do not simply see; we see as.” See Ward, 107-108. 
10
 Adams and Elliott, 363-364. 
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be the world,” the descriptive method of dogmatics must include this redemptive action 
within its account. 
With regards to a theological description of ecclesial music, then, the descriptive 
dogmatician could present a nuanced hearing of a particular performance—somewhat 
similar to a concert review in The Times or Rolling Stone. Such a description must be 
perceptive enough to account for what the music actually communicates. The ability to 
hear incarnational themes (i.e. embodiment/sensuality, emotion/desire, 
cosmicality/rationality) in music would be paramount for such description to succeed in 
its task. If God’s participation in and transformation of the world is made evident through 
a positive description, then the music is indeed genuine musical proclamation. If, 
however, the description suggests something other than God’s saving work in the world, 
then the practitioners would be advised to take the implied criticism into consideration 
when preparing for future performances. Thus the performance is dealt with on its own 
terms, as the description may include references to specific notes and relationships 
between notes. The description is not purely tonic, however, as rhythm and timbre may 
also be include within the analysis. The critical judgment of the description is not 
prominent, but neither is it absent, as advocates of the “description project” prefer to 
leave the dogmatic judgment latent within the description itself. Whether such judgments 
are spelled out is not the primary issue in the present discussion, however. The key aspect 
of theological description with regards to the type of theology of music proposed here is 
that it attends to the particularity of musical performance. No broad generalities are 
offered that would reduce or ignore specific performance practices. The particularity of 
those practices must be heeded and criticism provided on that basis.  
The descriptive dogmatic method is just one possibility of doing a dogmatics of music 
that attend to the particularities of performance, however. Whether dogmatic judgments 
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are overt or latent, however, the specificity of the attention paid to particularities of 
performance should be a key component of any contemporary theology of music. For it is 
in those musical particularities that the logos becomes, to use Benedict’s phrase, 
“musified.” The logos was made concrete in the particular person of Jesus Christ. For the 
benefit of those outside of Christ’s immediate and concrete presence, that logos was 
further particularized in the words of scripture, testifying to His person. And it is in the 
Church’s kerygma that the same logos is proclaimed again and again in that which is 
heard: in preaching and in song. Through speech and music the church has the potential 
to proclaim the gospel and thus share in God’s redemptive participation in the world 
through the Word of God made flesh. It is this Word that makes theology possible, as it 
reflects upon the faith that comes from hearing.  
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